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WORKING 9 TO 5: EMBRACING THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT THROUGH AN INTEGRATED
MODEL OF PRISON LABOR
I. INTRODUCTION
The numbers are disheartening: there were 2,293,157 prisoners in
federal, state, and local jails and prisons in 2007.1 States used 38.2 billion
dollars for correctional expenditures in 2001.2 Sixty-eight percent of state
prisoners did not receive a high school diploma.3 The average
recidivism rate of prisoners incarcerated for common crimes is 74.2%.4
At the very least, these statistics suggest that the American prison
system is dysfunctional.5 This dysfunction is indicative of the historical
friction between the goals of imprisonment—punishment and
rehabilitation—and the rights the Constitution guarantees to prisoners.6
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/prisons.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2008). At the time the Author of this Note
obtained this information, the most current statistics were from 2007, reported in December
2007. Id. The 2007 total number of incarcerated individuals increased by 1.5% from 2006.
Id.
2
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/abstract/spe01.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2008). This number represents a 145%
increase from 1986 expenditures. Id.
3
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/abstract/ecp.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2008). The Department of Justice published
this percentage in 2003. Id.
4
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/abstract/rpr94.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2008). This percentage is the average
recidivism rate of prisoners incarcerated for the following crimes: robbery, burglary,
larceny, motor vehicle theft, sale of stolen property, and possession, use, or sale of illegal
weapons. Id. Unfortunately, the Bureau of Justice has not conducted a study of recidivism
since 1994. See id. See also Interview with Joe Arpaio, Sheriff of Maricopa County, Ariz., in
Phoenix, Ariz. (Nov. 19, 2007). The sheriff of the largest county in the country suggests the
average recidivism rate among state and federal prisoners hovers around 60–65%. Id.
5
See Jonathan A. Willens, Structure, Content, and the Exigencies of War: American Prison
Law After Twenty-Five Years 1962–1987, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 41, 48 (1988). Although prisons
“hold, feed, shelter, accept, and release prisoners,” they also “beat, stab, rape, isolate,
humiliate, terrify, inspect, objectify, disable, demoralize, brutalize, and discipline
prisoners.” Id. While some of these functions are essential to prison administration, some
of them obviously are not. Id. Willens explains why “prisons make prisoners” by stating:
Prison rules and regulations, the day-to-day operation of the
institution confront the inmate with an image of himself that is
grotesque and absurd. A prisoner who refuses to internalize this
image, who insists upon seeing other versions of himself, is in constant
danger. Institutions exist separate from us, but when we internalize
their existence the nature of the separation begins to change.
Id. at 49 (quoting in part JOHN WIDEMAN, BROTHERS AND KEEPERS 183 (1984)).
6
See infra Parts II.A–D (describing how the Supreme Court has struggled to balance the
level of constitutional scrutiny it imposes on actions of prison administrators).
1
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More specifically, four goals of imprisonment creating the tension are:
punishment, retribution, rehabilitation, and reform, or some varying
combination.7
The purpose of this Note is to methodically compile the history and
case-law pertaining to prisoners’ rights, including Eighth Amendment
claims, and apply it to the microcosm of prison labor.8 This Note
proposes that throughout the history of imprisonment, administrators
have placed primary importance on each of the aforementioned goals
depending upon the circumstances of the times.9 Furthermore, this Note
proposes that these goals of imprisonment can coexist peacefully in the
twenty-first century and they can be balanced to form an integrated
model for prison labor that meets constitutional scrutiny and exceeds the
Nation’s expectations.10 Essentially, the Supreme Court’s constitutional
interpretation is a historical guide and an operational template to use
and on which to expand; it is not a set of rules to circumvent.11
Part II of this Note explores the history of prisoners’ rights in
conjunction with the Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.12
It includes a brief look into prisoners’ rights in the new millennium and
the direction the Court is taking regarding the constitutionality of prison
labor.13 Part II concludes by describing six traditional models of prison
labor and its use in prisons throughout the nation’s history.14 Next, Part
III focuses on the traditional models of labor introduced in Part II and
analyzes the wisdom of its usage from policy and constitutionality
perspectives.15
Finally, Part IV introduces the framework for a
previously nonexistent model code of prison labor, integrating the
constitutional standards and policy goals of the traditional models and
See infra Part II.D (describing some current labor programs and their goals). See also
Willens, supra note 5, at 49 (explaining Michel Foucault’s theory that prisons are “essential
machines and laboratories of social discipline[]”).
8
See infra Parts II–III (recounting the history and constitutionality of prisoners’ rights
and analyzing those guidelines as applied to prison labor).
9
See infra Part II (explaining the periodic shifts in popular thought about the goals of
imprisonment).
10
See infra Part IV.B (outlining a proposed model code for the imposition of labor
programs in prisons).
11
See infra Part II (discussing the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretation of
prisoners’ rights).
12
See infra Parts II.A–C (explaining the ways in which the Court has applied these
amendments to prisoners and the conditions of their confinement).
13
See infra Part II.D (tying the Court’s reluctance to find any conditions unconstitutional
into the reemerging “hands-off” mentality).
14
See infra Part II.E (explaining how each model works, and describing examples of their
use throughout history).
15
See infra Part III (discussing the benefits and detriments of six traditional models of
prison labor and their possible constitutional infirmities).
7
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moving beyond them to create the possibility for many hybrid models of
prison labor.16 Above all else, Part IV proposes that every able-bodied
general population prisoner should work.17
II. BACKGROUND
Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system.18
The history of prisoners’ rights in America is also a history of human
emotion and necessity.19 When a person violates the societal code,
Americans have demonstrated a desire for a sentencing system that
focuses on punishment, retribution, rehabilitation, and reform.20 The
need for the most cost-effective, time-effective, and space-conserving
mode of justice has frustrated many people and has played an equal part
in the history of prisons and the treatment of prisoners.21 Throughout
time there have been very different penal notions, but perfecting the
balance of the aforementioned pillars has been the common goal.22 Even
though the goal may be unified, the systems utilized to achieve the
proper balance have changed dramatically depending on how the courts,
the public, prison administrators, and academics defined it.23

See infra Part IV (outlining briefly the operating guidelines for a variety of public and
private sector programs).
17
See infra Part IV.B (proposing that under the categorization of prisoners, only the most
violent or ill offenders would be excluded from the work programs).
18
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
19
See infra Part II.A (discussing public attitudes toward the purpose of incarceration).
20
See infra Part II (describing the historical shifts in the primary goal of imprisonment
from retribution to rehabilitation).
21
See infra Part II.D (summarizing the Court’s current reluctance to pass judgment on
the wisdom of prison management, despite their historical tendency to do so).
22
See infra Part II (explaining that the Court has tried to balance constitutionally
guaranteed rights with the need for effective prison administration).
23
See infra Part II. The forces affecting prison administration include court attitudes,
internal prison administration, and public perception. See infra Parts II.A–D (focusing on
the interplay between the courts, the public, and prison administrators). The ultimate
penological goal of finding the correct balance between punishment, retribution, and
rehabilitation is timeless. See infra Parts II.A–D (recounting the shifting popularity of
punishment, retribution, reform, and rehabilitation as the primary objective of
imprisonment). However, different balances have been struck at specific time-periods in
American history. See infra Part II.A–D (breaking up the history of prisoners’ rights into
historical eras). This Note focuses specifically on the balance as it relates to prison labor.
See Parts II.E, III, and IV (explaining, analyzing, and expanding on traditional prison labor
models).
16
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This Part delves into the history of the goals, the means used to
achieve them, and the influencers of penology from the inception of the
Constitution to the present.24 The attitudes of the courts and the public
regarding appropriate conditions of confinement for prisoners directly
impacted the imposition of hard labor as a component of sentencing.25
Furthermore, the continuing interpretation of the Eighth Amendment by
the courts has oscillated between restraining the meaning to that
intended by the Framers and expanding it to include a wider variety of
punishments and conditions.26
During the Nation’s infancy, the
attitudes of the judiciary, reflected through the holdings of the courts,
were largely premised on a fear of past atrocities committed in England,
coupled with a strong legacy of corporal punishment.27 In fact, a
sentence of hard labor was the preferential means throughout the
nineteenth century to achieve the goal of punishment.28 At the cusp of
the twentieth century, however, prison labor fell out of favor with both
the courts and the public.29 Through a methodical analysis of pertinent
constitutional amendments and their application throughout history, this
Part summarizes the rights afforded and denied to prisoners over the last
two centuries and the models used to imprison men at hard labor, which
will be the focus of the remainder of the Note.30
A. The First Hundred Years
From this Nation’s inception, there was little debate about the
inclusion of the Eighth Amendment to the Bill of Rights.31 In the outer
24
See infra Part II notes and accompanying text (dividing the history of prisoners’ rights
into eras focusing on punishment, reform, equality of process, and abstinence pertaining to
prison administration issues).
25
See infra Part II.A (describing the Court’s lackadaisical attitude about the treatment of
prisoners in the late 1700s and early 1800s).
26
See infra Part II.C (explaining that the Court started expanding the definition of cruel
and unusual punishment in unprecedented ways, and noting that the peak of that
expansion occurred in the 1960s).
27
See infra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the events surrounding the
Bloody Assize of 1685 and other sources of the traditional definition of “cruel and unusual
punishment”).
28
See infra note 36 and accompanying text (quoting the Court’s original attitude toward
imprisonment that the decisions of jailers should not be questioned).
29
See discussion infra Part II.B (describing late nineteenth and twentieth century
attitudes promoting the idle confinement of prisoners, perhaps as a result of prison labor’s
connection to slavery).
30
See discussion infra Part II (after outlining the standards the Supreme Court has
identified in analyzing questions relating to prison rights, Part II outlines six traditional
models of prison labor).
31
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Id.
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ambit of the Framers’ consciousness were the memories of atrocities that
took place in England under the rule of King William and Queen Mary
of the Stuart dynasty, such as the Bloody Assizes of 1685.32 In fact, the
language of the Eighth Amendment was substantially copied from the
language of the English Act of Parliament in 1688.33 The adoption of a
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368–69 (1910). Only two representatives, Mr.
Smith and Mr. Livermore, opposed the adoption of the Eighth Amendment, both on the
grounds that the language was too indefinite and lacked meaning. Id. Mr. Livermore
commented:
The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which
account I have no objection to it; but, as it seems to have no meaning in
it, I do not think it necessary. . . . No cruel and unusual punishment is
to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often
deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we, in
future, to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they
are cruel?
Id. at 369. See also Tessa M. Gorman, Note, Back on the Chain Gang: Why the Eighth
Amendment and the History of Slavery Proscribe the Resurgence of Chain Gangs, 85 CAL. L. REV.
441, 462 (1997) (discussing the development of the Eighth Amendment). Before the
colonies became a nation, the Virginia colony incorporated a prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishments in its constitution. Id. Furthermore, the federal government
included the clause in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Id.; Yale Glazer, Note, The Chains
May Be Heavy, but They Are Not Cruel and Unusual: Examining the Constitutionality of the
Reintroduced Chain Gang, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1195, 1202 (Summer 1996) (describing that
Virginia’s Declaration of Rights contained the exact words prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment as did the English Bill of Rights of 1689).
32
Weems, 217 U.S. at 371. See James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead: Warehouse Prisons,
Paradigm Change, and the Supreme Court, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1003, 1009 (1997). The Bloody
Assizes refers to a series of trials for treason in which those convicted were burned,
disemboweled, beheaded or sentenced to other particularly gruesome forms of death. Id.
The heads of the executed prisoners were often displayed on poles for the townspeople to
see. Id.
33
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890). The act, titled “An act for declaring the rights
and liberties of the subject, and settling the succession of the crown” stated:
[E]xcessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal
cases, to elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the
subjects, and excessive fines have been imposed, and illegal and cruel
punishments inflicted . . . excessive bail ought not to be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Id. (quoting 1 St. Wm. & Mary, c. 2). See Robertson, supra note 32, at 1009. Blackstone,
widely read by the delegates of the state conventions, vilified other types of barbarous
punishment as well. Id. at 1009. Further examples of punishments intended to be
prohibited include: cutting off ears or hands, branding, placing prisoners in the pillory or
rack, and any other form of “lingering death.” Id. at 1009–10.
See also Daniel E. Hall, When Caning Meets the Eighth Amendment: Whipping Offenders in the
United States, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 403, 410 (1995). Long before the English Bill of Rights,
legal documents contained the notion of proportionality in sentencing. Id. For example,
the Bible mandated lex talionis, or “eye for an eye,” in Leviticus. Id. (quoting Leviticus
24:19–20). See also Gorman, supra note 31, at 459–60. In addition to Biblical mandates for
punishment, Greek philosophers and the Magna Carta, to name a few, discuss proper
punishments for crimes. Id.
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prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment referred specifically to
tortures such as crucifixion, the thumb-screw, disemboweling, burning
at the stake, and other methods of punishment that caused death or the
lingering fear of death.34
The simplicity of the Amendment was clear in the minds of early
justices. Therefore, few courts have interpreted the Eighth Amendment
and prisoner’s constitutional rights.35 The first Supreme Court opinion
concerning prisoners’ rights in 1809 did not mention the Eighth
Amendment specifically, but made clear the prevailing notion of judicial
restraint regarding matters of prison administration, even at this early
stage in the Republic.36 Sixty-nine years later, in 1878, the Court refused
to limit states and territories to the congressionally prescribed method of
death by hanging for capital offenses, thus allowing states and territories
latitude in preferring methods of execution without necessarily violating
the Eighth Amendment.37
In 1868, the inclusion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution made the Eighth Amendment applicable to the states,
although in practicality it had little effect on the judiciary’s
interpretations because most states already had similar prohibitions on
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE
ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 46–50 (1971). Colonial New
England provided for many different and sometimes innovative punishments for various
crimes. Id. For example, while banishment, whipping, and imposition of a fine were
popular, a convict may also have been sentenced to stand at the gallows with a noose
around their neck for a number of hours. Id. at 48. Notably, convicted criminals were
rarely sentenced to imprisonment as jails were used solely for those awaiting trial. Id.
35
See infra note 36 (quoting the brief opinion in the first case to squarely address prison
administration).
36
Ex Parte Taws, 23 F. Cas. 725 (1809). The entirety of the opinion read as follows:
We do not think it right to interfere with the jailer in the exercise of the
discretion vested in him, as to the security of his prisoners; unless it
appeared that he misused it for purposes of oppression, of which there
is no evidence in this case.
Id. From the affidavits, it appeared that Taws had made threats to escape, and as a
consequence the jailer restricted Taws to his room and denied him access to the yard. Id.
However, the Court eluded that if a jailer misused his authority for the purpose of
oppression, the Court may interfere. Id. See infra Part II.C. This “hands off policy” would
disappear and reemerge in the next two centuries. See infra Part II.C.
37
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 133 (1878). A man duly convicted of first-degree
murder in the Territory of Utah was sentenced to be “publicly shot until [he was] dead” in
accordance with the laws of Utah. Id. at 131. The first national crimes act of Congress
provided for death by hanging for capital offenses. Id. at 133. The Court held that
Congress did not intend the statute to supersede the power of the states in deciding the
proper method of execution. Id. In keeping with the spirit of the Eighth Amendment, the
Court was not concerned with other provisions of the state law at issue that called for
imprisonment at hard labor during a life sentence, in lieu of a death sentence duly entered
by a jury. Id. at 136.
34
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cruel and unusual punishment in their own constitutions.38 However,
the Fourteenth Amendment did signal the Court’s forthcoming—even if
only temporary—desire for uniformity of punishment amongst the states
by requiring a grievance procedure for prisoners in accordance with due
process of law.39
The constitutionality concerning the imposition of hard labor on a
convicted criminal was squarely addressed and upheld in two late-1800s
cases, thus reaffirming the limited scope of the phrase “cruel and
unusual punishment.”40 The Court drew a fine distinction between cases
where hard labor must be part of the punishment by statute and cases
where imprisonment alone was required by statute.41 A minute
statutory distinction made a large difference to prisoners when the Court
held that lower courts may, at their discretion, sentence a convict to
serve out his punishment in a penitentiary where hard labor is incident
to discipline at the institution.42 As a result, the distinction drawn in
these cases allowed punishment through hard labor to be imposed even

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Pertinent portions of Section 1 provide:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Id. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446–47. In Kemmler, the Court did not explicitly apply the
Eighth Amendment to the states, but instead relied on the New York Constitution of
substantial similarity in upholding the state’s right to find that electrocution was a more
humane method of imposing death than hanging. The Court noted that the interpretation
of the New York Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment would be
“equally true of the [E]ighth [A]mendment, in its application to [C]ongress.” Id. See also
Gorman, supra note 31, at 464. The Court rejected the argument that “novel” punishment is
the same as “unusual” punishment. Id.
39
See infra Part II.C (discussing the Court’s increasingly uniform treatment of federal
and state prisoners). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (holding that
prisoners are guaranteed similar Due Process rights as citizens accused of a crime).
40
Ex parte Karstendick, 93 U.S. 396, 399 (1877) (stating that when imprisonment at hard
labor is prescribed by statute as part of a punishment, the court is without discretion;
however, if it is not prescribed by statute, the court has discretion to sentence the criminal
to an institution that uses hard labor as a method of discipline); In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263,
266 (1890) (noting that punishments for a term greater than one year may be served at an
institution that employs hard labor if the statute does not prescribe otherwise).
41
Ex parte Karstendick, 93 U.S. at 399. The Court has discretion to impose imprisonment
at hard labor when the statute is silent on the issue. Id.
42
United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48, 60–61 (1894). The Court relied on the former
opinions to uphold the sentence of a convicted horse-stealer, which provided for
imprisonment of five years in an Ohio state penitentiary that employed “hard labor” in the
usual course of discipline. Id. at 50, 61.
38
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if not prescribed by statute.43 In the Court’s fervency for punishment, it
even extended the constitutional imposition of hard labor to many
consecutive sentences that, when aggregated, led to shockingly severe
punishments for multiple petty crimes.44
By the close of the nineteenth century the Court had expressly
approved of confinement at hard labor in a number of circumstances,
leaving a wide range of acceptable punishments to lower courts to meet
the varying circumstances of each case.45 The penological goals were
changing, however, and the conditions were set for the implementation
of the big house.

43
See id; Ex parte Karstendick, 93 U.S. at 399. But see Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 428–
29 (1885), which cites Sir William Blackstone’s commentary that infamous punishments
include confinement to hard labor and further delineates that infamous punishments are
not limited to those that are cruel and unusual. Id. (citing 4 Bl. Comm. 377). Therefore,
imprisonment at hard labor, an infamous punishment, violates the Constitution. Id. at 429.
Perhaps foreshadowing later decisions, Wilson implies that changes in public opinion over
the ages may also change what punishments shall be considered infamous. Id. at 427.
44
O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331–35 (1892). In O’Neil, the Court dismissed the
writ of error because the question posed did not even raise a federal question. Id. at 335.
The imposition of a sentence of 19,914 days confinement at hard labor for 457 offenses of
selling intoxicating liquor—three days for each dollar of the unpaid fine originally
imposed—was not deemed cruel and unusual because the “unreasonableness is only in the
number of offenses which the respondent has committed.” Id. at 325, 331.
45
Pridgeon, 153 U.S. at 61. See ROTHMAN, supra note 34, at 237. Imprisonment in the first
half of the 1800s meant institutionalization in asylums. Id. Asylums sought to treat
prisoners as patients, and imprisonment as medicine. Id. at 133. Rothman describes the
organization and goals of the asylum:
Create a different kind of environment, which methodically corrected
the deficiencies of the community, and a cure for insanity was at hand.
This, in essence, was the foundation of the asylum solution and the
program that came to be known as moral treatment. The institution
would arrange and administer a disciplined routine that would curb
uncontrolled impulses without cruelty or unnecessary punishment. It
would re-create fixity and stability to compensate for the irregularities
of the society. Thus, it would rehabilitate the casualties of the system.
Id.
By the second half of the century, however, the asylum was failing and
institutionalization “decline[d] from rehabilitation to custodianship[.]” Id. at 239. See also
FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION 67 (1982). After the
Civil War, a new penology developed, motivated to fix the problems of the asylum. Id.
The main problem with the asylum, as they saw it, was that prisoners were sentenced to a
fixed term, resulting in a lack of motivation to reform. Id. To remedy this, the new
penology advocated indeterminate sentencing.
Id.
Prisoners sentenced to an
indeterminate time in a penitentiary would supposedly have greater motivation to
“reform” because positive actions would decrease their sentence. Id. Indeterminate
sentencing remains a cornerstone of the penal system today. Id.
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B. The Fall of Prisoner Labor
Though some academics advocated a new type of prison they called
the Reformatory, the public, more confident by the Court’s confirmation
of the constitutionality of tough treatment like hard labor and various
modes of execution, preferred mass institutions to satisfy a growing
public desire for punishment.46 Penologists, who saw criminal deviance
as a social contagion, sought to cure it through a diet of solitude, labor,
and contemplation; however, it is unclear whether they viewed it as
punishment, rehabilitation, or both.47
The labor portion of the penologists’ cure took the form of both
public and private hiring of prisoners through a system of peonage.48
46
Robertson, supra note 32, at 1012. The public increasingly viewed criminal deviance as
a “familial defect” and a “failure of upbringing.” Id. at 1011. In an effort to regain social
control after the chaos of the Civil War, the most notorious of prisons, including Auburn
Prison in New York and Pennsylvania’s Eastern and Western Penitentiaries, were built. Id.
See Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoner’s Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339, 350 (1998). (noting that
Pennsylvania’s “‘silent’[ ] system” kept inmates confined in separate cells, working in
silence for the dual purpose of containing the contagion of deviance and instilling
discipline to keep “evil thoughts” at bay); Jonathan A. Willens, Structure, Content and the
Exigencies of War: American Prison Law After Twenty-Five Years, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 41, 70
(1987). Unexpectedly, this silent system, developed by the Quakers, drove prisoners
insane. Id. In contrast, while Auburn prisoners also worked in silence, they worked
collectively. Id. To maintain order, however, wardens were often violent, and the violence
required to make the Auburn model work led many to deem the model a failure in terms of
its ability to reform prisoners. Id.
47
Robertson, supra note 32, at 1012. Robertson discusses the shift in popularity from
corporal punishment to imprisonment in warehouse prisons that “squander human
potential. [ ] . . . offer[ing] an existence, not a life. . . . storing and recycling offenders.” Id. at
1005–07. He concludes that warehousing is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at
1007. See also SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, WITH LIBERTY FOR SOME 179 (1998); LOUIS N.
ROBINSON, PENOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 159 (1921). The Elmira Reformatory of postcivil war is typical of the structure of the reformatory movement. CHRISTIANSON, supra, at
179. At Elmira, all inmates entered on the same level and were reevaluated every six
months for progress. Id. As they progressed, inmates moved through three levels, each
with increased privileges. Id. An inmate progressed by making satisfactory “grades” on a
number of activities and learning experiences designed to take the inmate from prisoner to
productive member of society. Id. However, one scholar examining the system deemed
one-half of inmates “incorrigible,” attributing their lack of progress to heredity. Id.
48
Garvey, supra note 46, at 344–45. Two systems called the “state-use” system and the
“contract” system were particularly prevalent. Id. The state-use system allowed the sale of
prison-made goods to state markets and the imposition of “public-works” projects staffed
by prisoners, and is still used today. Id. The contract system allowed the sale of prisoners’
labor to private firms while maintaining state control over custody, care, and discipline. Id.
at 345. See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 158–59. Private parties were unable to compete with
contractors’ low prices. Id.; see also BLAKE MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS 94 (1974) (The
Univ. of Chicago 1938). The growing movement of organized labor strongly opposed the
contract system: by the 1880s, the National Labor Party, the Knights of Labor, and the
Federation of Organized Trades and Labor, had anti-contract clauses as part of their
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Although peonage systems were enormously popular, the Court defined
“peonage” in 1905 as indebtedness and denounced it as servitude in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.49 The Court reinforced the
declaration of the Thirteenth Amendment in several cases and, while
maintaining that convicted criminals can be subjected to involuntary
servitude as a condition of confinement, suggested that the practice of
hiring out convicts to private parties may amount to involuntary
servitude.50 Until this time, prisons utilized the practice widely to
provide the mutual benefits of cheap labor to private industry and
additional funds to penitentiaries.51
platform. Id. See George E. Sexton, Franklin C. Farrow & Barbara J. Auerbach, The Private
Sector and Prison Industries, in RESEARCH IN BRIEF (Nat’l Inst. Of Justice, Washington, D.C.),
Aug. 1985 at 1 for further information about the popularity of anti-contract clauses.
49
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215–16 (1905). Clyatt was convicted of
unlawfully and knowingly returning persons to a condition of peonage by forcibly
returning them to his firm to pay off their debt. Id. at 214. The Court did not flinch at his
sentence of four years’ confinement at hard labor, and strongly condemned the practice of
peonage as a violation of the prohibition on servitude, whether voluntary or involuntary.
Id. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The Thirteenth Amendment declares:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Id.
50
Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 218–19. In addition to Clyatt, the Court found unconstitutional
conditions of peonage in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911), and United States v.
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914). Reynolds was similar to Clyatt in that the Court
condemned the condition of private peonage. Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 146–47. In Reynolds, a
private person was allowed to confess judgment for another and post surety for him in
return for a term of labor to pay off the debt. Id. at 139–40. If, however, the laborer refused
to work before the debt was paid off, he was returned to jail, where he could again be
confessed to judgment by another and placed in the same manner of indebtedness, likely
for a larger amount of money. Id. The Court rejected the theory of voluntary contract and
stated that “the convict is thus kept chained to an everturning [sic] wheel of servitude” in
constant fear of being re-imprisoned. Id. at 146–47. The Court compared the nineteen
months of servitude under the system of surety with the maximum of four months at hard
labor that would be imposed by the state and found the disparagement disgusting. Id. at
147–48.
In contrast, Bailey involved a law that made it a crime to break a ‘contract’ to work to
repay a debt, punishable by imposing a fine double the damage of the lender in
conjunction with a period of imprisonment at hard labor. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 228. The Court
held that the law amounted to involuntary servitude and stated, “[t]he state may impose
involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime, but it may not compel one man to labor
for another in payment of a debt, by punishing him as a criminal if he does not perform the
service or pay the debt.” Id. at 244.
51
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 157 (1993).
The oldest system in America, with its roots in English prison farms, is the “leasing
system”. Id. See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 156–57. Under the lease system, a private
entity pays the government a sum of money in return for possession of a prisoner; thus, the
lease system puts prisoners entirely in the control of private parties. Id. The lessee owns all
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By 1900, however, privatized prison labor was becoming unpopular
in America primarily for economic reasons.52 Firms that did not contract
with prisons were unable to compete with those that did.53 Although
admittedly less important to most Americans, escalating data of prisoner
brutality alarmed a vocal portion of the public.54
Additionally,
legislators and academics took signals from the Court when it intimated
the possible unconstitutionality of contracting prisoners for labor.55 The
continuing backlash of the slave era coupled with ideas of a new
morality ushered out a fiscally responsible and economically beneficial
alternative to continuous confinement to a cell.56
C. Carving Out the Rights of Prisoners
1.

Weems v. United States57

The seminal case that attempted to define cruel and unusual
punishment is Weems v. United States.58 The Court struck down the law

goods and services the prisoner produces and is also responsible for the prisoner’s basic
needs. Id. at 158; see Bailey, 219 U.S. at 245 (1911) (holding that a law making it a crime to
break a contract to work to repay debt is tantamount to involuntary servitude). See
alsoCHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 181. The system was very popular in the early days of
the Union, but fell out of favor when the Supreme Court linked the practice to slavery. Id.
52
See infra note 53 (describing the public concern that prison-manufactured goods
would put free labor manufacturers out of business).
53
ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 172–74. The Commissioner of Labor’s statement in 1905
clarifies why free labor industries fought to eliminate prison labor: “In several industries,
as stove hollow ware, saddletrees, and certain kinds of whips and whiplashes, the prisonmade goods have entirely or practically driven the products of free labor from the market.”
Id.at 172 (quoting Twentieth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor at 49 (Washington,
1905)). See Sexton, supra note 48, at 6. In fact, during the depression, Congress passed laws
prohibiting prison-made goods from being transported interstate in an effort to destroy
competition with free labor. Id. at 6. See also BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/piecp.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) (discussing
the qualifications for becoming certified to transport prison-made goods interstate).
54
Garvey, supra note 46, at 358, 363. One particularly damning story involved a man
who was convicted of a relatively minor crime of vagrancy and leased to a company to
strip turpentine for ninety days. Id. at 363. Unable to keep pace in the hip-deep mud, he
was beaten to death. Id. at 364. See infra Part II.E (providing examples of prisoner brutality
under the lease system).
55
See infra Part II.E (describing that the leasing system and similar systems of surety
have strong ties to involuntary servitude).
56
See supra notes 50–53 (explaining the factors leading to the decline of prison labor).
But see FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 159. Despite the decline of prison labor, prison
populations continued to increase. Id. Friedman notes that, “[i]mprisonment was and
remained the basic way to punish men and women convicted of serious crimes.” Id.
57
217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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outlining Weems’s fifteen-year sentence on the grounds that it violated
the Eighth Amendment.59 In 1910, for the first time, the words “cruel
and unusual” were extended beyond methods of corporal punishment to
include a prohibition on sentences that were “so disproportionate” to the
offense.60 Furthermore, the Court employed the principle of a living
Constitution to work elasticity into an otherwise rigid Amendment.61 At
the same time, the Court stressed the importance of judicial restraint in
deferring to the legislature to adopt penal laws that are congruous with
the gravity of the crime.62
In Weems, the Court managed to
58
Id. Weems actually involved the Philippine Penal Code; the Philippines were a
territory of the United States at the time. Id. at 357. The complaint alleged that Weems
embezzled from the government by entering wages as paid out to employees when the
wages were not actually paid. Id. at 357–58. The imprisonment was to be served at a penal
institution where he would work to benefit the state. Id. at 364. The imprisonment was
termed cadena temporal, the third highest in severity. Id. at 364. The absolute highest
penalty was of course death, and the second highest was cadena perpetua, or life
imprisonment. Id. Furthermore, under the classification of his sentence, he was required to
wear chains at the ankles and wrists and perform hard and painful labor, and was further
prohibited from outside contact. Id.
In addition to the penalty while imprisoned, Weems was further condemned to a
perpetual limitation of his liberty by requirements that authorities have constant notice of
his domicile and employment. Id. The Court, in particularly passionate language,
described the severity of Weems’s loss of liberty:
He is forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within
voice and view of the criminal magistrate . . . . He may not seek, even
in other scenes and among other people, to retrieve his fall from
rectitude. Even that hope is taken from him, and he is subject to
tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars and stone
walls, oppress as much by their continuity, and deprive of essential
liberty.
Id. at 366. Interestingly, the Court’s only mention of labor in regards to the law was that
“painful labor” must be more than “hard labor,” though it did not know exactly what that
meant. Id.
59
Id. at 382. Weems was an officer of the Bureau of the Coast Guard and was convicted
of falsifying public documents with the intent to defraud the United States government and
sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment. Id. at 357. The Court held the law
unconstitutional, though it recognized that the punishment has “no fellow in American
legislation” and comes from a “government of a different form[.]” Id. at 377.
60
Id. at 368. The Court did recognize the novelty of the Philippine Code in providing for
an elastic sentencing system of minimum, medium, and maximum sentences, which is
used almost universally among the states today. Id. at 365.
61
Id. at 373. The Court’s new paradigm is evidenced by phrases such as “[t]ime works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be
vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.” Id.
62
Id. at 379. The Court explained this restraint as a “subordination of the judiciary to the
legislature”:
However, there is a certain subordination of the judiciary to the
legislature. The function of the legislature is primary, its exercise
fortified by presumptions of right and legality, and is not to be
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simultaneously reaffirm the notion of deference to legislators and prison
administrators regarding sentencing and imprisonment while vastly
expanding the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment to include the
notion of proportionality in sentencing.63
Expectedly, the expansion of the Eighth Amendment led to a flood of
applications for writs of habeas corpus because, for the first time, the
Supreme Court gave prisoners viable claims.64
Despite growing
procedural difficulties with the inundation of writs, the Court upheld the
importance of prisoners’ access to the courts.65 As the once popular idea
of prisoners as social contagion waned, a new era began that extended
unprecedented rights to prisoners.

interfered with lightly, nor by any judicial conception of its wisdom or
propriety. They have no limitation, we repeat, but constitutional ones,
and what those are the judiciary must judge. We have expressed these
elementary truths to avoid the misapprehension that we do not
recognize to the fullest the wide range of power that the legislature
possesses to adapt its penal laws to conditions as they may exist, and
punish the crimes of men according to their forms and frequency. We
do not intend in this opinion to express anything that contravenes
those propositions.
Id.
Id. at 373. The pleadings contained no allegations of unconstitutionality based on the
Eighth Amendment and the Court dispensed with that potentially fatal problem and
instead decided the case on exactly those grounds, to which Justice White dissented. Id. at
383. He argued that the majority incorrectly decided the case because
[n]either at the trial in the court of first instance nor in the supreme
court of the Philippine Islands was any question raised concerning the
repugnancy of the statute defining the crime and fixing its punishment
to the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights, forbidding cruel and
unusual punishment.
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
64
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 301 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). As an example,
in the decade spanning 1937 to 1947, six prisoners at Alcatraz filed sixty-eight petitions,
and in a five year period in the District of Columbia, one prisoner filed fifty petitions. Id. at
301 n. 4. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004). “[H]abeas corpus” literally
translates from Latin to “that you have the body.” Id. A writ of habeas corpus is often
used to challenge the legality of one’s imprisonment by bringing that person before a court.
Id.
65
Compare Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 482, 484–90 (1969) (holding that prison regulations
barring inmates from helping other inmates form habeas corpus claims are
unconstitutional regardless of the impact on prison discipline), with Price, 334 U.S. at 269–
94 (holding that the proper court may issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring the presence
of a prisoner whenever it deems it necessary in the interests of justice). In particular, Price
involved a prisoner whose claim was rejected, after requesting a writ four times, because
he failed to state a cognizable claim leaving the lower court no power to compel Price to
come before the court. Price, 334 U.S. at 270, 276. The Supreme Court held that it could
compel the prisoner to come before the court and appointed a member of the bar of the
Supreme Court to be his counsel. Id. at 278.
63
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Trop v. Dulles66

The second landmark case involving the Eighth Amendment was
Trop v. Dulles.67 Under a law that forfeited the citizenship of convicted
wartime deserters, the Court considered whether denationalization by
an act of Congress could constitute cruel and unusual punishment.68 The
Court struck down the law and announced a groundbreaking expansion
of Eighth Amendment rights.69 Under the new “evolving standards of
decency” test, with the guidance of a United Nations’ survey, the Court
invalidated the law as violating the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment.70
3.

The Height of the Prisoner Rights Movement

In 1972, the Court decided three cases regarding Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights of prisoners.71 The first case delineated
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
Id. Trop concerned a congressional statute, purportedly based on Congress’s war
powers, which penalized military desertion during a time of war with forfeiture of the
person’s citizenship. Id. at 87–89. The petitioner was indeed a deserter, though he had
been gone just a day and had turned himself in to an officer. Id. at 87. He was courtmartialed and sentenced to three years at hard labor. Id. at 88. Upon applying for a
passport some years later, he was denied on the grounds that he lost citizenship by way of
being convicted of wartime desertion. Id.
68
Id. at 101. The fundamental problem with the law was that it rendered a person
stateless, and therefore subject to the laws of wherever he happened to be. Id. See Glazer,
supra note 31, at 1205 (examining the Court’s use of the “evolving standards of decency”
analysis and its relationship to the issue of proportionality); Gorman, supra note 31, at 467
(focusing on the Court’s analysis of the “psychological effects of forced denationalization”);
Robertson, supra note 32, at 1050 (arguing that the Warren Court, with an Aristotelian
premise, posited that “a person’s communal status can effect his ‘very existence.’” (quoting
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 11 (1982)).
69
Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. The court declared that “[t]he [Eighth] Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.” Id. It is interesting to note that under the Court’s evolving standards of decency
test, the death penalty was almost off-handedly confirmed as a constitutional punishment
because it was widely accepted. Id.
70
Id. at 101, 103. The survey revealed that only Turkey and the Philippines punished
deserters by denationalization. Id. As a sub-issue, the Court questioned the statute on the
grounds that it was purely penal—which the Court defined as having no purpose other
than punishment—and thus subjected it to heightened scrutiny. Id. at 96–97. “Nonpenal”
laws “impose[ ] a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate
governmental purpose.” Id. at 96. It seems, however, that denationalization could be
imposed as a non-penal measure to further the government’s legitimate interest in
maintaining loyal citizens. See id.
71
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (punishments for disorderly conduct in the
prison can lead to valid due process claims); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(parole violators are entitled to certain procedural due process rights before parole is
66
67
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the crux of the due process argument for prisoners:
most
“allegations . . . however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the
opportunity to offer supporting evidence.”72 Haines v. Kerner went so far
as to hold that even inmates who hit other inmates with shovels had
rights.73 Two companion cases regarding parole followed in the same
year and in both cases the Court not only held that possible parole
violators are entitled to a hearing pending final revocation, it stated six
forms of process guaranteed to every individual, explained in the context
of a parole revocation.74 It was a judicially sound principle that the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed these rights to men accused of
committing a crime, but the extension of these rights to men convicted of
a crime was also groundbreaking.75 Morrissey v. Brewer was not decided
revoked); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321–23 (1972) (finding that a Buddhist state prisoner’s
claim that his faith inhibited his chances of eligibility for parole because of discrimination
within the penal system stated a claim upon which relief could be granted). See generally
supra note 38 and accompanying text (quoting the Fourteenth Amendment and its
application of the Eighth Amendment to the states).
72
Haines, 404 U.S. at 520–21. Haines was placed in solitary confinement as a disciplinary
measure after striking an inmate on the head with a shovel. Id. at 520. While in solitary
confinement, Haines claimed he suffered injury by having to sleep on the cell floor with
only blankets to alleviate the pain from a previous injury. Id. The Court held his complaint
stated a claim that required an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 521.
73
See supra note 72 (detailing the facts of Haines).
74
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472. In Morrissey, the Court held that every individual, even a
convict, is entitled to six rights of Due Process. Id. at 488–89. First, the parolee must have
written notice of the claimed violation. Id. at 489. Second, the parolee must have access to
the evidence against him. Id. Third, the parolee must have the opportunity to be heard
and to present evidence and witnesses in his favor. Id. Fourth, the parolee has the right to
cross-examine the State’s witnesses unless there is good cause to disallow it. Id. Fifth, the
hearing must be neutral and detached, but not necessarily comprised of lawyers or judicial
officers. Id. Finally, the parolee is entitled to a written statement such as an opinion
relating the evidence the fact-finders relied on in revoking parole. Id.
In both cases, the petitioners argued that they were denied a hearing prior to
revocation of parole. Id. at 472. Morrissey was convicted of drawing false checks and was
paroled. Id. He was arrested seven months later for violating the terms of his parole by
buying a car under an assumed name and making other false statements. Id. at 473. After
spending a week in jail, his parole was revoked. Id. at 472–73. Booher, the petitioner in the
unnamed case, committed similar violations of parole and was similarly held until his
parole was revoked. Id. at 473.
75
See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id. Willens, supra note 46, at 65. In addition to the courts expanding the power of a
prisoner, prison officials were also experimenting with granting prisoners more power. Id.
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with a thumb on the public pulse of the 1970s, but in an effort to move
the country forward, perhaps beyond its readiness; the provisions
allowing such expansive post-conviction rights to prisoners prompted
some people to warn of the proverbial “slippery slope.”76
Perhaps as a backlash to the broad notice and hearing rights
afforded to prisoners, the Court scaled back some due process
protections in subsequent cases.77 For example, the Court stressed the
need for a balance between the needs and objectives of the prison
institution and the general rights guaranteed to prisoners.78 However, in
step with Trop v. Dulles, the nature of prison disciplinary hearings in the
future could change due to changed circumstances.79 The “hands off”

For example, at the Washington State Penitentiary in Walla Walla, officials gave prisoners
the power to elect a committee to make recommendations to the administration. Id. The
experiment was at least partially successful; while the prison courtyard had once been a
restricted security area, it was opened during the experiment, with newly planted grass,
and prisoners “often walked across the yard carrying briefcases or escorting guests.” Id.
76
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488–89, 493 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (warning of the possibility
or even inevitability that prisoners will end up running the prison). With the increasing
popularity of supervised release in the 1970s and its integral part in contemporary criminal
justice, Justice Douglas, ultimately correct, warned that these enhanced protections for
incarcerated persons represent an “outworn cliche” and are problematic when presented
with “present-day realities.” Id. at 493 n.3 (quoting F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO
CORRECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR MANPOWER AND TRAINING 32 (Joint Commission on
Correctional Manpower and Training 1969)).
77
See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (the Court takes a more flexible approach
toward Due Process rights and prison administration).
78
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In Wolff, the Court returned some
deference to prison administrators that had been previously enjoyed before the initial
assertion of the Court into such matters. See id. The district court found that the Nebraska
penal and correctional complex employed the following procedural safeguards:
(1) a preliminary conference with the Chief Corrections Supervisor and
the charging party, where the prisoner is informed of the misconduct
charge and engages in preliminary discussion on its merits; (2) the
preparation of a conduct report and a hearing held before the
Adjustment Committee, the disciplinary body of the prison, where the
report is read to the inmate; and (3) the opportunity at the hearing to
ask questions of the charging party.
Id. at 558–59. Accordingly, the Court held that, in the case of a disciplinary proceeding, a
prisoner is not entitled to retained or appointed counsel. Id. at 569. The argument against
counsel is basically that lawyering begets lawyering and this is contrary to the “predictive
and discretionary” nature of a hearing. Id. (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787–
88 (1973)). The focus should be on the rehabilitative purpose of the discipline, and given an
adversarial climate, the hearing body may be disinclined to tolerate “marginal[ly] deviant
behavior.” Id. at 570 (quoting Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787–88)).
79
Id. See also Willens, supra note 46, at 126. The nature of prison disciplinary
proceedings did change when the Court held that disciplinary boards did not have to make
a record of its reasons for denying a prisoner’s request to have witnesses at the hearing. Id.
Willens noted that “[t]he right to call favorable witnesses has therefore become
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doctrine was becoming increasingly popular as the Court gradually
eroded the due process rights previously extended to prisoners.80 In
opposition to earlier holdings, the Court refrained from interfering with
prison administrators and signaled a return to the deferential treatment
on matters concerning the order and discipline of a prison.81
4.

The Return of Deference

The conditions of confinement in prisons have been challenged
often, but such challenges have not recently been adjudged
constitutional. In perhaps the most obvious signal that the increase of
protections afforded prisoners was at an end, Estelle v. Gamble82
introduced the deliberate indifference standard—the most deferential
standard since the turn of the twentieth century.83 Essentially, the Eighth
meaningless except in those cases when a prisoner is able to get his case before a judge.”
Id. at 126–27.
80
See Montayne v. Haymes 427 U.S. 236 (1976). In Montayne, prison officials seized a
document that was signed by eighty-six other inmates that a prisoner was circulating
claiming he was denied legal assistance by way of removal from the law library. Id. at 237–
38. Several days later, Montayne was transferred to a maximum-security prison, but he
suffered no loss of privileges or good time. Id. at 238. Surprisingly, the Court found no
hearing requirement because a prisoner has no right to remain in a particular facility. Id. at
243. The Court may have been influenced in finding no liberty interest by evidence that the
prisoner had worked as a law clerk at the library but was relieved because of his constant
disregard for the rules. See id. at 238. See also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 240–51
(1983) (finding that even long distance transfers do not implicate a liberty interest unless
granted one by state statute); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 216–29 (1976) (holding that
the transfer of a prisoner from a medium to a maximum security prison did not implicate a
“liberty interest” and thus did not require a hearing to comport with Due Process).
81
See Montayne, 427 U.S. 236. In Montayne, the Court found for a second time that there
was no necessity for a hearing at all before or after a prisoner is transferred to another
prison facility, as long as the confinement is lawful and within the prisoner’s sentence. Id.
at 243. Cf. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 139, 147 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (Marshall views the return of the “hands off” doctrine as a step
backward caused by a fear of the formation of a union for prison reform and hopes the
return of the doctrine will be temporary) (quoting Fox, The First Amendment Rights of
Prisoners, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 162 (1972)).
82
429 U.S. 97 (1976).
83
Id. at 104. A claim of deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s illness or injury states a
cause of action under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Civil
Rights Act provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State of Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Amendment is violated when prison officials demonstrate “deliberate
indifference” to a prisoner’s serious medical needs resulting in the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”84
The “deliberate indifference” standard proved to be a very difficult
hurdle for prisoners to overcome, and few claims have survived under
it.85 In a 1994 case regarding workplace conditions, a boar attacked a
prisoner while working at a prison-run hog farm.86 The prisoner claimed

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Estelle was injured while working as a prisoner when a bail of
cotton fell on him. Id. at 99. He was subsequently seen on seventeen occasions, prescribed
various pain medications, and returned to work between each visit, until he refused to
work and was eventually hospitalized for irregular cardiac rhythms. Id. at 100–101, 107.
He alleged in his complaint that the bail of cotton was six hundred pounds and the
treatment he received after the injury constituted cruel and unusual punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 99 n.3. The Court held that Estelle did not state
a claim under section 1983 because negligent treatment by his doctor did not constitute
“deliberate indifference.” Id. at 104–06. It is notable that the second requirement of
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” was borrowed from Gregg v. Georgia. Id. at 104
(citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 18283 (1976) (ending the nationwide moratorium on
the death penalty)). See also Snipes v. Detella, 95 F.3d 586, 588–93 (7th Cir. 1996) (removing
a toenail without anesthetic does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because
even gross negligence does not equate to deliberate indifference and medical judgments
should be accorded substantial deference).
85
See generally Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 98–108. For an illustration of the difficulty in
overcoming the “wanton infliction of unnecessary pain” requirement, consider that the
Court ruled in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber that a mechanical malfunction that
thwarted the first attempt to electrocute a prisoner, requiring a second electrocution, was
not unconstitutional because the first attempt was “an innocent misadventure.” Id. at 105
(citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947)). See also Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 323–24 (1985). In Whitley, a prisoner who was shot during the quelling
of a riot did not have an Eighth Amendment claim because the purpose of the shot was a
good-faith effort to restore discipline to the prison. Id. at 323–24. This case has since been
restricted to emergency situations such as the prison riot at issue. Id. at 320. Furthermore,
the Court noted that a verbal warning before firing would be desirable, even in an
emergency. Id. at 324. Compare id. at 314–28, with Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4–12
(1992) (O’Connor, J.) (holding that excessive force against an inmate does not necessarily
have to manifest itself as serious injury to be prohibited). See also Warren v. Missouri, 995
F.2d 130, 130−31 (8th Cir. 1993). Warren stands for the proposition that a prisoner does not
have an Eighth Amendment claim when he is injured as a result of negligent working
conditions in a prison workshop. Id. at 131. Warren was struck in the wrist by a board that
“kicked back” from a saw he was operating in a furniture workshop. Id. at 130. The Court
held that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because Warren could not
show deliberate indifference, but at best negligence. Id. at 130–31.
86
Lee v. Sikes, 870 F. Supp. 1096, 1098 (S.D. Ga. 1994). Lee pled guilty to three counts of
burglary and was sentenced to five years at Coastal Correctional Institution in Georgia, but
was reassigned to Rogers Correctional facility. Id. After testing, Lee was assigned to work,
cleaning and feeding hogs. Id. While in a breeding barn, a hog attacked Lee, causing a ten
to twelve centimeter laceration on his right knee, and other injuries to his shoulders, neck,
and head. Id. Lee claimed he had properly secured the hog in its pen prior to the attack.
Id. Although Lee received emergency medical treatment, he alleged that he did not receive
84
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that this attack constituted deliberate and wanton indifference because
he was not provided the proper facilities, training, equipment, or
medical care; as with most cases, the Court found his complaint
insufficient to warrant an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim.87
There is no doubt that at points in American history, the treatment of
prisoners has been inhumane, no matter what the public opinion was at
the time.88 For example, the conditions in an Arkansas penitentiary were
so abhorrent, in fact, that the district court called it “a dark and evil
world completely alien to the free world[ ]” and held that Arkansas’
punishment for minor misconduct, relegating prisoners to “punitive
isolation”, constituted cruel, unusual, and unpredictable punishment. 89

proper “follow up” care, and was still undergoing treatment when he was released on
parole. Id.
87
Id. at 1098. In an attestation to the changing of times, two cases were deemed to at
least raise an Eighth Amendment issue that would never have been contemplated by the
Framers. Id. See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828–51 (1994) (holding that a
transsexual prisoner may have an Eighth Amendment claim if prisoner officials knew of
the substantial risk of serious bodily harm to the transsexual prisoner and were
deliberately indifferent); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 28–37 (1993) (holding that
exposure to second-hand smoke in prisons may constitute deliberate indifference).
88
See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681–82 (1979). Hutto is the quintessential example of
prison conditions gone awry. Id. The conditions cannot be described in more vivid terms
than the Court employs:
Cummins Farm, the institution at the center of this litigation, required
its 1,000 inmates to work in the fields 10 hours a day, six days a week,
using mule-drawn tools and tending crops by hand. The inmates were
sometimes required to run to and from the fields, with a guard in an
automobile or on horseback driving them on. They worked in all sorts
of weather, so long as the temperature was above freezing, sometimes
in unsuitably light clothing or without shoes.
The inmates slept together in large, 100-man barracks and some
convicts, known as “creepers,” would slip from their beds to crawl
along the floor, stalking their sleeping enemies. In one 18-month
period, there were 17 stabbings, all but 1 occurring in the barracks.
Homosexual rape was so common and uncontrolled that some
potential victims dared not sleep; instead they would leave their beds
and spend the night clinging to the bars nearest the guards’ station.
Inmates were lashed with a wooden-handled leather strap five feet
long and four inches wide. Although it was not official policy to do so,
some inmates were apparently whipped for minor offenses until their
skin was bloody and bruised.
The ‘Tucker telephone,’ a hand-cranked device, was used to
administer electrical shocks to various sensitive parts of an inmate’s
body.
Id. at 682 nn.3–5 (internal citations omitted).
89
Id. at 681–82 (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970)). In Holt,
respondent prison administrators were honest about the conditions of their prison, but
argued that the conditions were constitutional:
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However, conditions such as those described above in Hutto v.
Finney were the exception rather than the norm and, in general,
prisoners’ complaints of conditions of confinement have not been
successful.90 Specifically, the Court has held that even restrictive and
harsh prison conditions are part of the penalty offenders pay for their
offenses, and the Court will not disturb those conditions absent a
showing of “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.”91 Bluntly
stated, the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.92
Prison conditions are likely to withstand Eighth Amendment claims
if the following list of things is not grossly inadequate: food, air
ventilation, noise, space, and learning resources.93
Even pretrial
detainees—that is, people presumed innocent—who are severely
restricted in confinement have failed in their claims premised on Eighth
Amendment violations.94 In fact, a prisoner’s desire to live comfortably
Respondents do not contend that they are operating a “good” prison
or a “modern” prison. With commendable candor they concede that
many of the conditions existing at the Penitentiary are bad. However,
they deny that they are operating an unconstitutional prison or are
engaging in unconstitutional practices. They say that they are doing
the best they can with extremely limited funds and personnel.
Holt, 309 F.Supp. at 365.
90
See, e.g., Warren, 995 F.2d at 131 (describing a prisoner’s serious injuries that did not
constitute an Eighth Amendment claim). See supra notes 88–89 (discussing Hutto). See also
infra notes 93, 95 and accompanying text (citing examples of cases where prison conditions
were deemed constitutional).
91
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility
(“SOCF”) was by all accounts of the time a state-of-the-art maximum security facility. Id. at
341. Built in the early 1970s, it contained over 1600 cells, “gymnasiums, workshops, school
rooms, ‘dayrooms,’ two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barbershop, and library.”
Id. at 340. The cells were well-equipped and opened onto dayrooms that were open during
daytime hours. Id. All cell doors would open for ten minutes every hour to allow
prisoners to move to different locations throughout the prison. Id. An increase in Ohio’s
prison population led to overcrowding in SOCF and administrators decided to “doublecell[ ]” 1,400 inmates, meaning two inmates shared a cell designed for one person, 75% of
whom had free movement outside their cells throughout the day. Id. at 341–42. Two
inmates brought suit, claiming that housing two inmates in a single cell constituted cruel
and unusual punishment and violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 339.
92
Id. at 349.
93
See id. at 342. The Court in Rhodes found the facility adequate in all respects,
regardless of several problems. Id. SOCF had seen an increase in violence, though
proportionate to its rate of growth. Id. at 343. Furthermore, although the prison
population was 38% above capacity, SOCF had not hired more psychiatrists and social
workers. Id. Inmates complained of reduction in work hours because jobs had to be split
between more people. Id. Perhaps most importantly, several studies indicated that each
inmate in a prison should have fifty to fifty-five square feet of living space, and the cells
with two inmates fell short of that number. Id. at 348.
94
See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243–45 (1983). In City of Revere, a
police officer shot and wounded defendant Kivlin. Id. at 240. Though the police took
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and without restriction during confinement does not automatically make
such restrictions “punishment” at all.95 Essentially, the Court uses
rational basis scrutiny and will uphold a prison condition if it is
“reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.”96 Indeed, a
condition or restriction must be completely arbitrary and purposeless to
fail rational basis scrutiny.97 Courts have upheld a number of restrictive
conditions using rational basis scrutiny, including “double celling,”98
prohibitions on certain paper mail and food packages,99 the regular
Kivlin to the hospital for medical treatment, when the hospital tendered a bill to the city of
Revere, the police refused to pay it. Id. at 240–41. Kivlin, left with a bill for over thirteen
thousand dollars, sued the city claiming it violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Id. at 242. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the police did not violate
Kivlin’s rights:
Whatever the standard may be, Revere fulfilled its constitutional
obligation by seeing that Kivlin was taken promptly to a hospital that
provided the treatment necessary for his injury. And as long as the
governmental entity ensures that the medical care needed is in fact
provided, the Constitution does not dictate how the cost of that care
should be allocated as between the entity and the provider of the care.
That is a matter of state law.
Id. at 245. This Note does not delve into the topic of whether pretrial detainees should
constitutionally be subject to the Eighth and Thirteenth Amendments because they have
not yet been convicted of a crime.
95
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979). The facility in Bell was similar to that of
Rhodes, but it was intended to be a temporary housing condition. Id. at 524; see Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991). The Court quoted a Seventh Circuit case in seeming
frustration at the large amount of insufficient claims:
The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or
deter. This is what the word means today; it is what it meant in the
eighteenth century . . . . [I]f [a] guard accidentally stepped on [a]
prisoner’s toe and broke it, this would not be punishment in anything
remotely like the accepted meaning of the word, whether we consult
the usage of 1791, or 1868, or 1985.
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300 (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985)).
96
Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. Subject to that test, the conditions are not considered punishment
at all. Id.
97
Id. The Court, being consistent with other decisions, was careful to point out that the
decision must be made objectively and cannot be based simply based on how the Court
thinks a prison should be run. Id.; see Willens, supra note 46, at 113–15. The Court’s
rational basis analysis in Bell v. Wolfish was indicative of the new corporate management
model becoming popular with the courts and prison administrators. Id. at 113. The
corporate management model treated prisons from the “science of management,” entirely
disregarding the old notion of prisons as medicine. Id. Not only does the model define
prison as a corporation “whose product is the ‘custody of prisoners[,]’” it rejects the
previously held idea that prisons have goals at all. Id. at 115. Most importantly, the
corporate management model rejects rehabilitation as a goal of imprisonment. Id. at 114.
98
See supra note 91 for the definition of “double celling” (“double celling” is the practice
of housing two inmates in a cell that is designed for one).
99
See generally Bell, 441 U.S. at 523–63 (prohibiting prisoner’s receipt of hardcover books
not directly from the publisher is not a violation of First Amendment rights); Jones v. N.C.
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practice of prison “shakedown” inspections, and even body-cavity
searches of inmates after contact visits.100 Some restrictions on prisoners
are based on a theory that prisoners have no expectation of privacy at
all.101 Above all, to succeed in a suit challenging conditions of
confinement, the prisoner must show that the prison official responsible
for the prisoner’s well-being acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind when imposing the condition.102 Rather than look to the effect on
the prisoner in determining whether “wantonness” existed, the analysis

Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 121–36 (1977) (holding that group activity could
pose friction in prisons and government must only meet rational basis scrutiny for
curtailment of First Amendment associational rights as prisons are not public fora);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 398–422 (1974) (holding that censorship of certain mail
correspondence poses only incidental restriction on free speech rights and is valid if it
furthers substantial government interests in security and order).
100
See generally Bell, 441 U.S. at 537, 555. This case differs from most cases regarding
prisoner rights because it involves the treatment of detainees not yet convicted of any
crime. Id. at 523. Nevertheless, the Court follows the mandate that prisoners do not have a
right to live comfortably and the Government has an overriding interest in maintaining
order and discipline. Id. at 537, 540.
101
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 522–23 (1984). Palmer was reprimanded and had to
reimburse the state for the cost of a pillowcase he ripped. Id. at 519-20. The pillowcase was
found in a garbage can during a routine “shakedown.” Id. at 519. Palmer brought suit,
claiming that the search violated his right not to be deprived of property without due
process of law, and that prison official Hudson intentionally destroyed some of Palmer’s
belongings to harass him. Id. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment, as it regards
searches and seizures, is not applicable to prison cells and therefore prisoners had no
privacy interest. Id. at 526. In fact, random searches are essential in the “constant fight
against the proliferation of knives and guns, illicit drugs, and other contraband.” Id. at 528.
The Court in Hudson justified even harsh conditions of confinement by explaining “what”
prisoners are:
Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of
persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal,
and often violent, conduct. Inmates have necessarily shown a lapse in
ability to control and conform their behavior to the legitimate
standards of society by the normal impulses of self-restraint; they have
shown an inability to regulate their conduct in a way that reflects
either a respect for law or an appreciation of the rights of others.
Id. at 526.
102
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. Wilson was incarcerated at Hocking Correctional Facility in
Ohio. Id. at 296. His complaint alleged that the conditions of his confinement violated his
Eighth Amendment rights. Id. The Court noted some of his complaints, including
“overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage space, inadequate heating and
cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining
facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates.” Id.
Wilson sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and $900,000 in compensatory and
punitive damages. Id. Building on the objective component of Rhodes, supra notes 86–88,
the Court required itself to also consider the subjective requirement of scienter on the part
of the official. Id.
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focuses on the constraints facing the official.103 The Court repeatedly
uses terms such as “serious deprivation” and “malicious cruelty” to
describe deliberate indifference as conduct wholly apart from mere
negligence.104
In the twenty-first century, the Court’s application of the Eighth
Amendment has centered on death penalty cases, and the Court’s most
recent application of the Eighth Amendment came in 2008 when it
invalidated a Louisiana rape statute that authorized the death penalty
for the rape of a child under twelve years old.105 The Court held that the
statute violated the Eighth Amendment and contemporary standards of
decency.106
On the issue of capital punishment, commentators

Id. at 303. Essentially, the Court will view “deliberate indifference” on a sliding scale,
depending on the circumstances that the official faced. Id.
104
Id. at 305. However, separate conditions not constituting deliberate indifference when
viewed alone may violate the Eighth Amendment if taken in the aggregate, and this
aggregation is permitted by petitioners. Id. at 304. The principle is severely limited to
conditions that have a “mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single,
identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a low cell
temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets.” Id.
105
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (holding that imposition of the death
penalty for raping a child is disproportional and against the country’s consensus); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (the execution of individuals under the age of eighteen when
they committed a crime violates the Eighth Amendment), abrogating Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361 (1989); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of
mentally retarded individuals constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). See also LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (2008). Section 14:42 governs rape generally, but has additional
provisions for child rape:
(2) However, if the victim was under the age of thirteen years, as
provided by Paragraph A(4) of this Section:(a) And if the district
attorney seeks a capital verdict, the offender shall be punished by
death or life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence, in accordance with the
determination of the jury.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. at § 14:42(D)(2)(a) (changing the aggravating age from twelve to
thirteen after the crime was committed but before the decision was issued).
106
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. at 2646; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42. Kennedy, the
most recent case addressing proportionality of sentencing, held it to be unconstitutional to
execute an individual convicted of rape. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2646. In Kennedy, a man was
convicted of raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter under section 14:42 of the Louisiana
Code. Id. at 2645–46; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42. The petitioner (defendant below)
violently raped his stepdaughter, resulting in lacerations of her cervix and complete tearing
of her perineum. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2646. Although the girl originally corroborated the
step-father’s story that two boys had dragged her into the front lawn and raped her, she
later admitted that the petitioner raped her in her bed and then drugged her because of the
profuse bleeding. Id. at 2647. The jury convicted him under the statute and unanimously
recommended the death penalty. Id. at 2648. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the
decision because “the rape of a child is unique in terms of the harm it inflicts upon the
victim and our society.” Id. at 2648 (citing State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757 (La. 2007)).
103
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immediately criticized the case for its analysis that no federal law
authorized the death penalty for rape because the Uniform Code of
Military Justice had in fact allowed this type of punishment for rape until
2007.107 On the other hand, the fact that the Court implicitly upheld the
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the imposition of the death penalty for the crime
of rape is in opposition to contemporary standards of decency and the consensus of the
nation. Id. at 2662. The Court applied the “evolving standards of decency” test put forth in
Trop v. Dulles, and relied on the interpretation of the test in Furman v. Georgia that stated:
“[t]he standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a
moral judgment.” Id. at 2649 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
Furthermore, the Court rejected the respondent’s argument that the Court’s decision
in Coker v. Georgia invalidated capital punishment for all crimes of rape, confining the
holding Coker to apply to adult rape only. Id. at 2654–55; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977). In Coker, the defendant was serving sentences for murder, rape and other heinous
crimes when he escaped from prison. 433 U.S. at 587. He entered Mr. and Mrs. Carver’s
house through an unlocked door and threatened them with a “board,” while tying up Mr.
Carver. Id. Coker then raped Mrs. Carver, threatening her with a knife he took from the
kitchen. Id. Subsequently, Coker took Mr. Carver’s money and car keys, and fled with
Mrs. Carver. Id. When police apprehended him, they found Mrs. Coker unharmed. Id.
The jury, being allowed to consider prior capital felony convictions as aggravating
circumstances, sentenced Coker to death. Id. at 590. Although, the Supreme Court was
historically charged with the duty of being blind to public opinion in upholding the law,
the Court in Coker deferred almost completely to public and legislative attitudes, and the
response of juries in determining the proportionality of a particular sentence. Id. This
decision is not surprising, however, given the acceptance of the test of “evolving standards
of decency.” Id. The Court found that Georgia was the only jurisdiction in the United
States that authorized a death sentence for rape. Id. at 595. Even under outdated laws,
only sixteen states classified rape as a capital offense, and of the sixteen, only Georgia,
North Carolina, and Louisiana provided for the death penalty for that offense. Id. at 594.
In holding that imposing the death penalty for the crime of rape violated the Eighth
Amendment, the Court shed light on how it will make an objective determination of the
proportionality of a sentence to a crime. Id. at 592.
Although the Court in Kennedy definitively stated that Coker did not address child rape, it
undertook a similar analysis by looking at the trends of legislatures and public attitudes
regarding the death penalty and child rape. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2652. After finding that
child rape is a capital offense in only six states, it concluded that “[t]he incongruity
between the crime of child rape and the harshness of the death penalty poses risks of
overpunishment and counsels against a constitutional ruling that the death penalty can be
expanded to include this offense.” Id. at 2662.
107
Id. at 2652; 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006) (Uniform Code of Military Justice Art. 120). The
Court briefly mentioned the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 that expanded the number
of capital crimes but did not include child rape among the list. Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. at 2652.
However, the Uniform Code of Military Justice’s rape statute is indeed federal law, and is
conspicuously absent from the Court’s opinion, and the petitioner and respondents’ briefs.
See generally id. at 2641. Until 2006, Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
specifically allowed the death penalty for raping a child, meaning that the Court’s
statement that federal law did not allow the punishment is invalid because at the time the
defendant was convicted it did. 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2000); National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. 109-163, Div. A., Tit. V, § 552(b) (Jan. 6. 2006) (effective Oct. 1,
2007).
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alternative punishment under the Louisiana statute—life imprisonment
at hard labor without possibility of parole—has not been controversial.108
The history of the Court’s analysis of prisoners’ rights is directly
correlated with labor in prisons.109 The early days of the Republic
adhered to the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, premised on
the memories of atrocities committed in England.110 As the nation’s
population grew, an increase in crimes, and therefore prisoners, led to a
change in prison administration that ultimately caused the Court to
protect prisoners in an unprecedented way.111 The pendulum inevitably
started to swing back by the 1980s, as the Court was bombarded with
habeas corpus requests, which caused it to again scale back its
interference with prison administrators.112 As a result, hard labor
returned to prisons in force in the mid-1990s and spawned a new wave
of debate about its consequences on prison administration and on the
Constitution.113
D. Prisoners, Labor, and the Meaning of Confinement: 1995 to Present
In 1995, Congress responded to the unmanageable rise in prison
litigation, foreshadowed by Justice Douglas, by passing the Prison
Litigation Reformation Act (“PLRA”).114 Perhaps it was the lack of a
108
See generally Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2641. The Court only invalidated that portion of the
Louisiana statute that provided for imposition of the death penalty—at the state’s request
and the jury’s decision. Id. Their lack of discussion regarding the alternative punishment
of life imprisonment at hard labor is an implicit affirmation of the constitutionality of the
penalty. Id.
109
See supra Part II (for a history of the Court’s changing analysis of the constitutional
rights of prisoners).
110
See supra note 32 and accompanying text (for a brief history of the Bloody Assize of
1685).
111
See supra Part II.C.3 (for a discussion of the Court’s increased protection of prisoners).
112
See supra Part II.C.4 (for a discussion of the Court’s decreasing involvement in prison
affairs and thus prisoners’ rights). See also Rod Miller, George E. Sexton & Victor J.
Jacobson, Making Jails Productive, RESEARCH IN BRIEF (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Washington,
D.C.), Oct. 1991, at 1. [hereinafter Miller]. Despite the Court’s official stance, in 1981, then
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered a speech at the University of Nebraska titled,
“More warehouses or factories with fences?” in which he encouraged correctional
institutions to teach prisoners job skills instead of just warehousing them. Miller, supra, at 1
n.1.
113
See infra Part II.D (discussing the resurgence of hard labor, including the
reintroduction of chain gangs in the 1990s).
114
Prison Litigation Reformation Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. §1997e (2000). The PLRA was
actually a second attempt to impose administrative exhaustion requirements. Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). Previous legislation enacted in 1980 allowed courts, at their
discretion, to stay a case while a prisoner exhausted only the plainest of administrative
remedies. Id. Pertinent portions of section 1997e include:
(a) Applicability of administrative remedies
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cohesive public attitude, or the growing number of states contemplating
and implementing forced labor as a facet of imprisonment that caused
the Supreme Court to remain largely silent on the issue.115 In the years
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
....
(c) Dismissal
(1) The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party
dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is
satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
(2) In the event that a claim is, on its face, frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, the
court may dismiss the underlying claim without first requiring the
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
....
(e) Limitation on recovery
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.
42 U.S.C. §1997e.
115
John David Morley, Back on the Chain Gang, TIMES U.K., Aug. 5, 1995, at Features. On
May 3, 1995, Limestone Correctional Facility in Alabama became the first prison in over
thirty years to put convicts back on chain gangs. Id. Prisoners sentenced to chain gangs are
mostly repeat offenders or parole violators and have had other privileges stripped, such as
permission to watch television, have visitors, or make purchases at the prison store. Id. See
Adam Cohen, Dispatches, TIME MAGAZINE, May 15, 1995, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,982949,00.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2008) (describing the sight of men in bright white uniforms, chained together); Miller, supra
note 112, at 1.
Between the height of the Depression and 1984, Congress imposed heavy restrictions
on the interaction of the private sector and prisons regarding labor, relying on interstate
commerce powers. Miller, supra note 112, at 1. However, in 1984 the Justice Assistance Act
started a pilot program for reinvestigating the use of prison labor in the private sector. Id.
See also Bureau of Justice Assistance, Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/piecp.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) [hereinafter
PIECP]. The Bureau of Justice Assistance administers a certification program in which
jurisdictions, on behalf of correctional institutions, apply for the right to interact with the
private sector. Id. Currently, the Bureau has issued forty-one of fifty available certificates.
Id.; Marilyn C. Moses & Cindy J. Smith, Factories Behind Fences: Do Prison ‘Real Work’
Programs Work?, NIJ JOURNAL NO. 257 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Washington, D.C.), June 2007,
at,
32,
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/journals/257/real-workprograms.html.http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/jr000257h.pdf (last visited Oct. 18,
2008). The re-arrest, conviction, and incarceration rates for PIECP workers are lower than
“other-than-work” programs. See Moses, supra, at 1.32.
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directly following the news that Alabama had reinstituted the chain
gang, law review journals across the country were rampant with
Articles, Notes, and Comments on both sides of the debate about the
constitutionality of hard labor, in particular, chain gangs.116 Since the
new millennium, however, cries from both sides have subsided, despite
increasing acceptance of chain gangs and other types of forced labor.117
For example, Congress retained the Shock Incarceration Program in
September of 2007, allowing the Federal Bureau of Prisons to place
inmates in conditions of strict discipline and hard labor for a period not
to exceed the remainder of their prison term.118 On a smaller scale,

See, e.g., Lisa Kelly, Chain Gangs, Boogeymen and Other Real Prisons of the Imagination, 5
RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 1 (1999) (telling a colorful story about the trials and hardships of
prisoners on a chain gang); Lynn. M. Burley, Note, History Repeats Itself in the Resurrection of
Prisoner Chain Gangs: Alabama’s Experience Raises Eighth Amendment Concerns, 15 LAW &
INEQ. 127 (1997) (arguing that chain gangs pose an unreasonable risk to prisoners and are
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment); Stephanie Evans, Note, Making More
Effective Use of Our Prisons Through Regimented Labor, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 521 (2000) (arguing
that reduced amenities for prisoners would serve to either rehabilitate prisoners or make
life in prison more undesirable than life outside, thus decreasing recidivism); Glazer, supra
note 31 (discussing the impact of the no-frills movement on prison management); Gorman,
supra note 31 (linking the historical use of chain gangs with slavery and concluding that
modern chain gangs amount to slavery); Sander Jacobowitz, Note, Rattling Chains and
Smashing Rocks: Testing the Boudaries [sic] of the Eighth Amendment, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 519
(1997) (analyzing the constitutionality of chain gangs based on the Supreme Court’s
previous decisions regarding cruel and unusual punishment); Nancy A. Ozimek, Note,
Reinstitution of the Chain Gang: A Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
753 (1997) (arguing that the chain gang’s historical roots in the oppression of AfricanAmericans makes it an unwise and possibly unconstitutional policy); Wendy Imatani
Peloso, Note, Les Miserables: Chain Gangs and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1459 (1997) (arguing that chain gangs are per se unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment); Emily S. Sanford, Note, The Propriety and Constitutionality of Chain
Gangs, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155 (1997) (arguing that chain gangs violate the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and disgrace notions of human
dignity).
117
See Dora Schriro, Correcting Corrections: Missouri’s Parallel Universe, SENTENCING &
CORRECTIONS (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Washington, D.C.), May 2008, at 1. In 1993, Missouri
implemented its “Buns Out of Bed” initiative, requiring all general population inmates to
work and to attend school and psychological treatment on a full-time basis, five days a
week. Id. See also Susan Turner & Joan Petersilia, Work Release: Recidivism and Corrections
Costs in Washington State, RESEARCH IN BRIEF (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Dec.
1996, at 1, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/163706.pdf (stating that although
forty-three states have work release programs, fewer than three percent of inmates are
participants in these programs).
118
18 U.S.C. § 4046 (2007). The statute states in its entirety:
(a) The Bureau of Prisons may place in a shock incarceration program
any person who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than
12, but not more than 30, months, if such person consents to that
placement.
116

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 11

1452 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County, Arizona (the largest county in
the country), has frequently made national headlines by being a visible
and vocal proponent of forced labor; almost a decade ago he became the
first sheriff to employ female chain gangs.119
(b) For such initial portion of the term of imprisonment as the Bureau
of Prisons may determine, not to exceed 6 months, an inmate in the
shock incarceration program shall be required to—
(1) adhere to a highly regimented schedule that provides the strict
discipline, physical training, hard labor, drill, and ceremony
characteristic of military basic training; and
(2) participate in appropriate job training and educational
programs (including literacy programs) and drug, alcohol, and
other counseling programs.
(c) An inmate who in the judgment of the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons has successfully completed the required period of shock
incarceration shall remain in the custody of the Bureau for such period
(not to exceed the remainder of the prison term otherwise required by
law to be served by that inmate), and under such conditions, as the
Bureau deems appropriate.
Id.; see also Doris Layton MacKenzie, James W. Shaw & Voncile B. Gowdy, An Evaluation of
Shock Incarceration in Louisiana, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 1 (June 1993) [hereinafter
MacKenzie] (explaining the goals and implementation of Louisiana’s shock incarceration
program, and its successes and shortcomings).
119
CNN.com, Arizona Criminals find jail too In-‘Tents’, July 27, 1999,
http://www.cnn.com/US/9907/27/tough.sheriff/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). “Sheriff
Joe,” as he is commonly called, is known for making prisoners wear pink jumpsuits, eat
cold meals, and stay in tents in the sweltering heat of summer, all in the name of
punishment. Id. He even tried to take away prisoners’ rights to cable but was thwarted by
a federal statute guaranteeing that right and instead opted to allow prisoners to watch only
such channels as The Weather Channel. Id.; see Interview with Joe Arpaio, Sheriff of
Maricopa County, in Phoenix, Ariz. (Nov. 19, 2007) (detailing some of the programs he has
instituted, the methods of punishment, and their purpose).
When asked about
rehabilitation, Sheriff Arpaio stated:
I believe, ah, I believe that those convicted like they are right now,
including Mike Tyson, uh, that that’s why he’s in pink underwear and
striped uniforms and two meals a day at fifteen cents a meal, fifteen to
eighteen cents, ah, that they should be punished. I use the word
punishment, but we do have rehabilitation, we do have education, we
have the only high school under a sheriff, we have a jail for juveniles,
we have a drug prevention [inaudible] I could go on and on, religion,
everything. So when they call me the meanest, toughest, sheriff in the
universe they never talk about our rehabilitation [inaudible]. Still you
should never live better in jail than you do on the outside and that’s
why they eat the slop—it’s not slop, it’s alright, it’s got 2500 calories—
that’s why they do that. That’s why they don’t have the, ah, the
movies, took those away, that’s why all the tv goes except the weather
channel, and the coffee and the salt and the ketchup, and the pink
underwear and the chain gangs and the hot tents, 148 degrees in the
summertime. I could go on and on and on and on with the theory is
you should not like it because maybe they’ll hate it so much they won’t
come back.
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A landmark event occurred in 2007 when the number of prison
inmates exceeded three million.120 In an increasing effort to recoup the
costs of housing these inmates, or at least exact retribution on them, most
states have instituted some form of labor program, and a growing
number of states have included hard labor as a component of their
programs.121 Furthermore, some states are experimenting with new
models of prison labor programs, drawing on historical models.122 The
Interview with Joe Arpaio, Sheriff of Maricopa County, in Phoenix, Ariz. (Nov. 19, 2007)
(Mike Tyson was in the Maricopa County Jail at the time of the interview).
120
See Behind Bars (Discovery Channel television broadcast Oct. 8, 2007).
121
See American Chain Gang (Cinema Libre Distribution 2005) (documentary) (cataloguing
labor policies in several states); supra note 49 and accompanying text (detailing the
Supreme Court’s invalidation of peonage as a valid labor model); infra Part II.E (describing
the contract model and its uses throughout history). Because the Supreme Court defined
peonage as slavery, forced labor in prisons took the form of one of several variations on the
contract model. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; infra Part II.E. First, the pieceprice model is very similar to the contract model, except that the government retains more
control over the production process. See infra Part II.E. See also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at
160. Whereas in the contract system, the contractor pays the government a sum for the use
of labor and the resulting product, in the piece-price system, the contractor does not pay for
the labor, but pays one fee per unit of output. Id. The private party contractor may still
send quality inspectors to the prison to ensure a good product, but the government warden
is the foreman of production. Id. Second, under a public-account system, all private
control is removed from the manufacturing process. Id. at 161. The prison administrator
essentially becomes the entrepreneur; he is responsible for commercial process all the way
from choosing what product to manufacture to choosing how to effectively market the
finished product. Id. A successful public-account system requires a prison administrator
who is also very business-savvy to function properly. Id. Third, the state-use model is a
uniquely innovative system wherein the entire market is self-contained within the prison.
Id. at 163. The prison is the gatherer, producer, laborer and consumer of goods. Id. The
most important aspect of the state-use model is its near removal of prison labor from
competition with the free labor market. Id. Finally, the public-works-and-ways model is a
special form of the state-use model in that it only uses prison labor to improve “the durable
possessions of the state.” Id. at 167. Thus, projects such as cutting brush along highways
are not contracted out or performed by a special department of state employees but are
instead performed by prisoners. Id.; infra Part II.E. The public-works-and-ways model is
growing in popularity among states today. See infra Part II.E.
122
Sexton, supra note 48, at 3. Three examples of states that are experimenting with
hybrid programs suggest that a widely implemented set of programs nationwide could
solve Twenty-First century prison problems. Id. First, in Arizona, Best Western
International hired women from Arizona’s correctional institution to take reservations for
Best Western Hotels. Id. With Best Western’s headquarters nearby, the use of prisoners
who were willing to work weekends and holidays was a positive solution for the prison,
the prisoners, and Best Western. Id. Second, Wahlers Company and Arizona Correction
Industries (“ARCOR”) started a joint venture in a furniture plant. Id. ARCOR built the
plant and supplied prisoners to work in it, while Wahlers supplied the equipment, and
both entities share in the profits. Id. The office furniture the plant produces is sold in the
open market and is also used by the state. Id. Third, a Minnesota state prison contracts
with Control Data Corporation (“CDC”) for the assembly of disk drives and other
computer products. Id. Prison employees supervise production and prisoner labor for the
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history of prisoners’ rights in America reveals vacillations between a
conservative ideology of punishment, epitomized by the phrase getting
“tough on crime,” and a liberal ideology of reformation and
rehabilitation.123 Both ideologies have the goal of reducing crime and in
particular, recidivism, and although they seek to counter idleness in
different ways, both ideologies hold that idleness in a prisoner is an
unacceptable trait.124
Historically, neither ideology has been
successful.125 The shift in ideological tides can be seen in the overarching
category of prison conditions generally, and it is also evidenced through
the prevalence and style of the subcategory of labor systems in
prisons.126
E. Six Existing Models of Prison Labor
The foregoing history aids a scholar in understanding the picture of
prison administration in order to study the comparatively small area of
prison labor because the judicial standards as applied to other areas of
prison administration are translated into prison labor policies.127 Of six
historical models, the lease system most closely parallels the free market
benefit of the prison and CDC, their sole customer. Id. To increase productivity and thus
profit, CDC provided the plant layout, training, and continuing technical assistance to the
prison. Id.
123
CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 45, at 89. Cullen and Gilbert credit Conservatives with
making rehabilitation a goal of prisons a “hard sell[,]” but do not completely absolve
Liberals either:
Conservatives have frequently been suspicious of efforts aimed at
regenerating offenders, fearing that they will furnish an excuse to
release the wicked back into society where they once again will prey
on the defenseless. Though objections have been raised less often by
more liberal elements, disenchantment with the prospect of molding a
criminal justice system around the rehabilitative ideal has long
sprinkled the writings and speeches of those on the left.
Id. See Sanford, supra note 116, at 1170 (noting that politicians hope to deter criminals by
giving the appearance of authoritative discipline).
124
See, e.g., supra note 46. See also Robertson, supra note 32, at 1011. The Auburn and
Philadelphia prison models sought to battle idleness by making prisoners work. Id. The
Philadelphia model stressed silent and solitary work, while the Auburn model stressed
silent and collective work. Id. at 1011 n.30.
125
See discussion supra Part II (discussing the apparent failure of historical prison labor
models); see also, e.g., supra note 46, infra note 137. The Auburn and Philadelphia
authoritarian models failed, however; Philadelphia’s silent system drove inmates insane,
and the violent supervision under the Auburn system discredited any notions of prisoner
reform. See supra note 46, infra note 137.
126
See infra Parts II.D-E (for a discussion of different historical prison labor models and
several contemporary experiments).
127
See infra Part III for an analysis of the constitutionality of prison labor models using
Eighth Amendment standards from other areas of prisoners’ rights jurisprudence.
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because it is essentially a contract between two parties for an exchange of
goods.128 When viewed as an exchange of chattels, it is easy to
understand why the Supreme Court intimated that the system amounted
to the reintroduction of slavery.129
The conservative ideology of punishment through hard labor
dominates the lease system.130 Under the lease system, the government
lends its convicts to private parties for a fee, and the private parties
control every aspect of the convicts’ lives.131 Historically, however, this
labor model produced infinitely more criminal deviance than it cured.132
When viewed as a crude metaphor, a dog that is constantly kicked by its
master becomes hardened and unpredictable, and will eventually lash
out with vengeance and blood-thirst. In sum, a prisoner that is treated
like an animal will eventually become violent toward the society that

128
See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 156 (defining the lease system); see also FRIEDMAN,
supra note 51 (describing the lease system).
129
See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914) (holding that systems of surety
are equivalent to private peonage and violate the Thirteenth Amendment); Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (holding that the state may impose involuntary servitude
as a punishment for a crime, but may not punish one as a criminal if he breaks a contract to
work for another private party); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 215 (1905) (returning a
person to a condition of servitude unlawfully and knowingly justifies a sentence of four
years at hard labor). See also Gorman, supra note 31, at 452–58 and Ozimek, supra note 116,
at 758–64 (suggesting that increasing conviction of African Americans is fueled by a desire
to “re-enslave them”).
130
ROTHMAN, supra note 34, at 103. Conservative criminologists believed that idleness
was closely linked to criminal deviance. Id. As Rothman states, “[p]roponents of a
penitentiary training believed that the tougher the course, the more favorable the results.”
Id. See Robertson, supra note 32, at 1012 (explaining the popular belief that criminality was
a familial defect and social contagion).
131
CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 181. Christianson describes the system as follows:
“[t]he state abdicated responsibility for the prisoners’ welfare, leaving it to private
contractors whose primary or exclusive objective was making a profit.” Id. See Garvey,
supra note 46, at 356. While the contract system dominated the North, the lease system was
favored in the booming post-Civil War economy. Id. at 355. Although the system was not
formally one of slavery, lessees were overwhelmingly black men performing work that
white freemen were unwilling to do. Id. at 356; Sanford, supra note 116, at 1157. In
addition to government leasing, a related practice of criminal surety emerged. Sanford,
supra note 116, at 1157. Under the criminal surety system, private citizens would pay the
fines of convicts in return for their labor. Id. If the convict refused to labor to the
satisfaction of the citizen, however, he could be returned to imprisonment. Id. See also
Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 150 (holding that systems of surety are unconstitutional).
132
See Schriro, supra note 117, at 1 (for a discussion of recidivism and prison brutality);
Turner, supra note 117, at 1 (PIECP members have lower recidivism rates than other
prisoners); Garvey, supra note 46, at 357. Convicts’ living and working conditions were so
abhorrent, in fact, that at its worst, convict mortality rates reached 40%, annually. Garvey,
supra note 46, at 357.
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imprisoned him.133 Because of the lease system’s failure to reform, the
number of prison brutality incidents at the hands of lessees, and the
system’s disruption of competition in the truly free labor market, the use
of the lease system largely ended by 1921 with only three states retaining
the system in its pure form at that time.134
Although the lease system fell out of fashion, the contract system
remained popular into the early 1900s.135 Typically, the government
supplied the facilities and machines for the product, while the contractor
was only responsible for the raw materials.136 Many prisons that
employed the contract model did so in an effort to reduce costs through
privatization.137 The model’s success was ultimately its demise, where it

See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 157. This Note does not suggest that prisoners are
animals; however, any living creature that is kept in a cage long enough may exhibit the
qualities of an abused animal. Id.; Robertson, supra note 32, at 1020 (“[T]he danger of
assault by predatory inmates represents an ongoing challenge to one’s manhood because
the inmate society equates ‘toughness’ with masculinity.”); Willens, supra note 46, at 137
(arguing that the current system advocates a “them and us” mentality, and that society
would benefit if that mentality was changed to one that saw prisoners as our family
members).
134
See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 157; Garvey, supra note 46, at 363. George W. Cable
published The Silent South in 1885 that shocked the nation with its story of a man who
lasted only two months under the system. Garvey, supra note 46, at 363. The man was
convicted of vagrancy and sentenced to ninety days in country jail, but was soon leased to
a lumber company where he was assigned to strip turpentine from the swamps. Id. When
he could not keep up with the fifteen-hour workdays, he was beaten to death. Id. at 364.
See also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 155–77. Tales of similar brutality ended the system in
most states; only Alabama, Florida, and North Carolina still used the prison lease model in
1921. ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 157. North Carolina was the last state to abolish the lease
system, and did not do so until 1933. Id.; CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187; Garvey,
supra note 46, at 364. The system took the longest to die out in the South, as even in 1885,
two-thirds of prisoners were still leased out. CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187.
135
See Garvey, supra note 46, at 344–45; supra note 48 and accompanying text (defining
the contract system). See also CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187. For example, an 1885
survey showed that New England had 17% of prisoners working in a contract system, the
Middle Atlantic had 41% in a contract system, the South had 15%, and the West had 42% of
its prisoners engaged in contract labor. Id. See also Garvey, supra note 46, at 358–59. The
fall of the contract model was due mainly to opposition from organized free labor. Id. The
early argument opposing convict labor was that it degraded the “dignity of free labor.” Id.
at 359. After a short time, however, the more honest argument against prison labor was
that it was an economic threat to the free labor market. Id.
136
See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 158. This is a large shift from the lease system, in that
in the contract system the government houses, feeds, clothes, and protects the prisoners.
Id.
137
Garvey, supra note 46, at 352. As a response to the failure of public-account systems
used in Cherry Hill and Auburn prisons, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, and
Indiana—to name a few—started a contract system of labor. Id. By 1867, the contract
model was the dominant labor model, and goals of profit slowly overtook goals of reform.
Id.
133
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competed so effectively with free labor manufacturers that they
successfully lobbied for its extinction.138
The piece-price model and the public-account model would be
plotted next along the continuum of increased government control over
prison labor.139 Under the piece-price model, private contractors
supplied the prison with the materials to make a certain product; the
prisoners then manufactured the product under the direction of
administrators; and the private contractor purchased the final product
for sale on the open market.140 The system is aptly named because,
whereas in the lease system the private party pays a price per person, in
the piece-price system the private party pays a price per piece.141 The
public-account system is similar to the piece-price system in that private
parties purchased a finished product manufactured within the prison.142
However, the public-account system removes all private interests from
the manufacturing process—the only role of the private party is as
purchaser or consumer, and the private party does not supply the prison
with the materials to make the products it purchases.143 There are few
specific historical examples of these systems because their conception
coincided with the Great Depression, which led the government to
abolish all prison labor that competed with free labor.144
138
Garvey, supra note 46, at 352. The breaking point for the contract model came with the
nationwide depression in the 1890s, when laws restricted the sale of prison-made goods to
the state. Id. at 362.
139
See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 159–60 (defining the piece-price model and the publicaccount model).
140
Garvey, supra note 46, at 349. Philadelphia’s “Walnut Street Jail,” opened in 1790 and
in reality an early penitentiary, utilized this model. Id. By the early 1800s, however, the
system was falling out of favor because prison overcrowding led to an inefficient
production system and the production system never yielded a profit. Id.
141
ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 160. The piece-price system has not been widely utilized.
Id.; see CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187. In 1885, not more than 8% of prisoners worked
in a piece-price system in any region nationwide. CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187.
142
ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 160; CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187 (providing a brief
description of the public-account system).
143
ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 160; CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187. Essentially, the
public-account (or state-account, as it is also called) system calls for the state to go into
business for itself, selling the products it makes on the open market. CHRISTIANSON, supra
note 47, at 187.
144
Garvey, supra note 46, at 366–67. In response to the Great Depression, the government
enacted the Hawes-Cooper Act and the Ashurst-Sumners Act. Id. The Hawes-Cooper Act
allowed states to prohibit other states’ prison-made goods from entering their state and
thus flooding their market. Id. Several years later, the Ashurst-Sumners Act made
transporting prison goods interstate a federal crime regardless of state law. Id.; see
CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187. Prior to the Great Depression however, states utilized
the system to produce such products as whips and saddlery hardware. CHRISTIANSON,
supra note 47, at 187. For example, in 1885, 22% of prisoners in New England worked in a
public-account system, as compared with 21% in the Middle Atlantic, 18% in the West, and
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Prison institutions responded to harsh restrictions on free market
sales by almost universally adopting the state-use model.145 The stateuse model creates a closed market in that prisons manufacture, market,
and sell their products exclusively to the state in which they are
located.146 Although hopes for the system were high, it was deemed a
failure for several reasons and largely resulted in prisoner idleness—the
very condition labor programs sought to avoid.147 Despite heavy
criticism, state-use systems are still popular in some states today.148
just 2% in the South. Id.; see MCKELVEY, supra note 48, at 220. Perhaps as a result of the
system’s moderate success, the United States Industrial Commission in 1900 and the United
States Commissioner of Labor on prison industry in 1905 “frown[ed]” on the practice and
favored the closed market state-use system instead. MCKELVEY, supra note 48, at 220.
145
Garvey, supra note 46, at 367. Whereas immediately before the Hawes-Cooper Act
16% of prisoners worked under a contract system, 42% under state-use systems, and 23%
under public works systems, by 1940, “almost all prisoners worked for the state.” Id.
146
ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 162–63. In general, state divisions must buy from the
prison if it can fill the request. Id. at 162. See Garvey, supra note 46, at 364–65; Ozimek,
supra note 116, at 756–57. In the state-use system, “the state represents the demand side of
the market[,]” and “[o]n the supply side, each individual inmate acts as a firm . . . .”
Ozimek, supra note 116, at 756. Ozimek contended that the system is inefficient because an
inmate will only exert effort if the benefit derived is greater than the cost. Id. at 757;
Garvey, supra note 46, at 365. The system manifested itself differently in the North than in
the South. Garvey, supra note 46, at 356. In the North, prisoners worked within the prison
manufacturing goods in prison shops. Id. In contrast, Southern prisoners worked on
prison farms and chain gangs. Id.
147
Garvey, supra note 46, at 368. After the Hawes-Cooper Act and the Ashurst-Sumners
Act were enacted, only 23% of state prisoners were working. Id. One reason for the
system’s failure is that prison officials were not trained for and did not desire to undertake
the business management aspect of their new positions. Id. Furthermore, although state
agencies were bound by contract to purchase prison goods first, they often did not until
they were forced. Id.; see ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 164. Robinson asserts that the stateuse system would be most effective where prisoners were employed in “growing
vegetables or in making clothing for themselves or in repairing or constructing buildings
forming a part of the institution in which they are confined.” ROBINSON, supra note 47, at
164. Robinson’s suggestion for the state-use system is essentially the application of the
public-works-and-ways model, a subset of the state-use model. Id. at 168.
148
Garvey, supra note 46, at 371. See Indiana Department of Correction News, Offenders
and Staff at Westville Correctional Facility Build New Wooden Conference Table for Governor’s
Office,
http://www.in.gov/indcorrection/news/07172007NewGovernorTable.htmlhttp://www.i
n.gov/indoc/news/07172007NewGovernorTable.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2008)
[hereinafter INDOC]. For example, Indiana employed this model in producing a table for
the Governor’s Office in 2007. Id. An Indiana prison had a wood-working class for
qualifying inmates, and the governor’s office commissioned the class to create a new table
for the entryway to the office. Id. All of the men in the class contributed to the project
under the watchful eye of the prison instructor, and the result was stunning to both the
governor and the public. Id. With $300 for raw materials and free labor, the prison
produced a solid wood table, inlaid with the insignia of the state. Id. Furthermore, the
counties of the state were hand-placed on the table using only species of trees that are
found in Indiana. Id.
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The final model, the public-works-and-ways model, is really a branch of
the state-use system.149 Under this system, prisoners labor for the benefit
of the state only on public projects, primarily by building roads.150 This
system has been used mainly in the South, and though it was disfavored
during the Great Depression, it has regained popularity in the last
twenty years.151
Comprehending the evolution of prisoners’ rights and the use of
forced labor in prisons requires contemplating the history of the
Republic, the Constitution, public opinion, and judicial opinion.152 It is
in this context that this Note will discuss the constitutionality, wisdom,
and appropriateness of prison labor in the twenty-first century.153
III. ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL STANDARDS AS APPLIED TO PRISON LABOR AND
THE WISDOM OF TRADITIONAL LABOR MODELS
Society has gone to extreme lengths to mystify prison, as if to empower the
institution by obscuring its inner workings.154
The history of prisoners’ rights includes the use of prisoners for
labor. Six models of prison labor have traded places as the most popular

149
ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 168. The public-works-and-ways model focuses prison
labor on public projects such as building or repairing roads, “draining swamps,” or
“reforesting devastated areas.” Id. at 169.
150
Id. at 167. Robinson stated that prisoners are working under this model if “prisoners
are employed mainly in erecting public buildings or in constructing highways or in similar
work where the purpose is to add to the durable possessions of the state[.]” Id. See
Ozimek, supra note 116, at 758. Ozimek maintained that public-works-and-ways models,
such as the use of chain gangs, are economically inefficient because prisoners do not have
the “proper” incentives to work. Id.
151
Garvey, supra note 46, at 365. In the South, Georgia began using the chain gang in
1908 to build much-needed roads on which automobiles increasingly traveled. Id. Georgia
coined the project the “good roads movement.” Id. See Ozimek, supra note 116, at 1158.
Judges began sentencing convicts to chain gangs in the 1860s in response to prison
overcrowding. Id. During the Great Depression, however, the federal government banned
prisoner labor in this form in favor of hiring unemployed free laborers. Id.; Garvey, supra
note 46, at 365. By the 1940s, chain gangs were no longer used. Garvey, supra note 46, at
366. But see Morley, supra note 115, at Features. In 1995, however, Alabama became the
first state to reinstate the chain gang. Id.
152
See supra Part II for a history of prisoners’ rights in America.
153
See infra Part III (providing an analysis of traditional prison models and their
constitutionality).
154
CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 307. Christianson explains his statement by
continuing, “This mystification serves to absolve society of responsibility, while conferring
legitimacy and morality on the prison itself. An aura of secrecy lends mystery and
idealization. For, indeed, few human inventions have become so charged with symbolic
meaning as the modern prison.” Id.
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throughout the past three centuries.155 The Supreme Court has not
addressed the constitutionality of five of the models, and the models’
use, or non-use, was historically connected more to complications with
the free market than with the Court.156 Each system has a differing
relationship to free labor and a different level of administration.157
Furthermore, each system offers the state and the prisoner different
monetary and non-monetary incentives.158
Part II of this Note
illuminated the big picture of administration and the jurisprudence
surrounding it and introduced traditional prison models.159 Part III of
this Note will discuss the benefits and detriments of the different prison
labor models introduced in Part II, and will apply the judicial standards
outlined in Part II to identify possible constitutional problems.160 Part III
of this Note will discuss each model in turn.161
First, the lease system has very positive effects for the government,
but likewise has negative effects on prisoners.162 Administration of
prisoners under the lease system is simple and cost effective for the
government because the government’s sole responsibility is to establish a
way for the lessee to choose and take possession of the prisoner.163 As a
result of the system’s cost effectiveness, the sum of money the
government receives is “profit.”164
155
See supra Part II.E (outlining six traditional models of prison labor); infra Part III
(examining the models’ strengths and weaknesses).
156
See supra notes 144–47 (describing the struggle between free labor and forced labor
because of forced labor’s ability to produce the same goods at a cheaper price, and also
discussing the government’s response to this dilemma).
157
See supra Part II.E (explaining that models range from being completely closed to the
free market to being completely integrated with it).
158
See infra Part III (stating that some models offer profit to the prison, while other
models are solely for the benefit of the prisoner).
159
See discussion supra Part II.
160
See infra Part III (hypothesizing that the lease system is the only system of the six with
a serious potential for unconstitutionality).
161
See supra Part II.E (the traditional models discussed are the lease system, the contract
system, the piece-price system, the public-account system, the state-use system, and the
public-works-and-ways system).
162
See infra notes 163–73 and accompanying text (noting that positive aspects include a
high profit margin for the government while negative aspects include high rates of abuse
toward prisoners and probable unconstitutionality).
163
See supra note 131 and accompanying text (indicating that under the lease model,
private contractors pay a sum to gain possession of prisoners for their private interests).
See also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 156. Robinson stresses that the lessee clothes, feeds,
houses, and protects prisoners. Id.
164
See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 157. Robinson reports that in 1912, Alabama grossed
$1,073,286.16 in earnings from its use of the lease system. Id. See also CHRISTIANSON, supra
note 47, at 187. As the system gained opposition, the original argument in favor of its
abolition was that it destroyed the dignity of labor; however, the more convincing
argument was that the system was so profitable that it seriously threatened free labor. Id.
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From the prisoner’s perspective, his very life is at the mercy of the
lessee.165 Economically, the lessee desires to produce the greatest
product for his money, and that motive encourages him to provide only
minimum necessities to the prisoner while working the prisoner as hard
as he can without causing death.166 Furthermore, the government has no
incentive to police the use of its prisoners, as prisoners are abundant and
easily replaceable.167
The lease model raises the most obvious constitutional problems.168
If it were reinstituted today in the same form as it was traditionally
administered, it would almost certainly be invalidated as violating the
Eighth and Thirteenth Amendments.169 Applying the concept of
evolving standards of decency, it is difficult to argue that under
contemporary standards of decency and humanity this treatment would
not amount to cruel and unusual punishment because of its strong
association with slavery.170
Furthermore, under the deliberate
indifference standard, courts could find that the wardens who turn their
head to the brutal treatment of prisoners are indirectly inflicting
unnecessary and wanton pain.171 Certainly courts could find the lease
model to be a deliberate attempt to circumvent the Thirteenth
165
See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (noting that at one time it was a crime
to break a lease, punishable by large fines and continuing imprisonment at hard labor); see
also note 134 and accompanying text (noting that in 1885, The Silent South was published,
recounting true stories of prisoner brutality that lead to death).
166
See Garvey, supra note 46, at 357. In fact, death was common under the system
because prisoners were easily replaceable. Id. At the height of the model’s use, convict
mortality rates reached 40% in some prisons. Id. See also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 157
(explaining that “[s]ince every unnecessary cent spent by the lessee on the prisoners would
reduce his profits by that amount, one would naturally expect to find the minimum of
existence supplied to the prisoners and the maximum of effort demanded from them”).
167
See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 157. In 1912, the brutality of the lease system was so
apparent that the governor of Arkansas pardoned 360 convicts and ended the use of the
lease system in the state. Id.
168
See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (recounting the Supreme Court’s
condemnation of “peonage” as a form of slavery and thus repugnant to the Eighth and
Thirteenth Amendments, while reaffirming that convicted criminals can be subjected to
other forms of involuntary servitude as a condition of their confinement).
169
See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905) (noting that it is unconstitutional to
knowingly and forcibly return people to a condition of servitude); supra note 50
(contrasting the holdings in Reynolds, which held that systems of surety are
unconstitutional, and Bailey, which held that the violation of any contract requiring labor to
repay debt could not be a criminal offense).
170
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (setting forth the requirement for
punishment to meet “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society[,]” the new test set forth by the Court ); supra note 69 and accompanying text.
171
See supra Part II.C.4 (discussing the deliberate indifference standard and the
requirement that prisoners demonstrate that prison officials engaged in the wanton
infliction of pain to prevail on a challenge to prison conditions).
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Amendment, and in fact, the Supreme Court has held that it does.172 In
short, under this system, the government simply replaces the slavetrader of old by selling humans to be used for involuntary servitude to a
private master.173
Second, the contract model draws on the positive aspects of the lease
model in that it allows private entities to obtain cheap labor and
maximum product.174 It also seeks to remedy the cruelty that prisoners
experienced under the lease model.175 This system is not without its
faults, however.176 For example, the contract system and the lease
system share the same incompatibility with the free labor market and are
opposed equally by interested parties.177 Furthermore, while each party
is performing the proper function—the government maintains the
prisoners and the contractor maintains the business—each party is
fundamentally at odds with the other.178 Ultimately, the government
profits less because it must pay to house the prisoners, and the contractor
profits less because he must pay more for the prisoner’s labor.179

See supra note 50 and accompanying text (noting that the practice of hiring out
convicts subjects them to involuntary servitude); see also Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 215 (holding that
a person cannot forcibly detain another person for the purpose of satisfying a debt); supra
note 129 (indicating that some scholars even argue that increased conviction of African
Americans is in reality an attempt to re-enslave them).
173
See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 146–47 (1914) (condemning a system of
posting surety bonds for a person in return for that person’s servitude). The court
described the agreement as “an everturning [sic] wheel of servitude” because of the
worker’s constant fear of re-imprisonment. Id.
174
See Garvey, supra note 46, at 344–45 (explaining that the contract system is similar to
the lease system except that, under the contract system, the prison retains the responsibility
to feed, clothe, and protect the prisoners). See also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 159.
Robinson believes there is more potential in the contract model than the lease system
because the contract model results in better treatment of prisoners and is therefore a milder
form of punishment. Id.
175
See Garvey, supra note 46, at 362 (noting that by 1867, the contract model was the
dominant labor model); supra note 134 (recounting a story of the brutal death of a prisoner
for not being able to work fast enough).
176
See MCKELVEY, supra note 48, at 93 (discussing the complex forces in play forming the
anti-contract movement).
177
See MCKELVEY, supra note 48, at 94 (giving an example of the opposition of free labor
to prison labor); see also Garvey, supra note 46, at 366–67 (the Hawes-Cooper Act and the
Ashurst-Sumners Act, passed during the Great Depression, made it a federal crime to
transport prison-made goods interstate); supra note 145 (describing the shift from the
contract model to the public-account model in response to the Hawes-Cooper Act and the
Ashurst-Sumners Act).
178
See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 158. Robinson makes much of the contract system’s
advantages, the most important of which being that “it does not require business ability on
the part of the prison officials nor humanitarian impulses on the part of the contractor.” Id.
179
See id. at 159 (however menial the amount of money lost on each prisoner by each
side, the loss of profit can be significant in the aggregate).
172
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From the prisoner’s perspective, his life is more bearable because in
place of punishment are characteristics that approach, but fall short of,
reformation.180 For example, the prisoner is not idle during the day as he
would be in a warehouse prison, and the prisoner learns the discipline
and self-worth of a workingman without experiencing the unpredictable
anger of a brutalized animal.181 However, an improvement in living
conditions does not equate with adequate living conditions, as accounts
of dangerous and unsanitary conditions exist under the contract model
as well.182 Because the model satisfies neither the penological goal of
reformation nor a prisoners’ desire to live in safe conditions, the model is
undesirable.183
Third, the invention of the piece-price model is another
improvement in preserving the humanity of prisoners but is also another
step away from the efficiency and profitability of the old lease system.184
A positive aspect is that wardens, if they choose, can show a great
amount of care for prisoners, as they serve as both boss and caretaker.185
However, administration takes on a new level of complexity, and

See CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 179. Elmira Reformatory implemented some of
the most groundbreaking reform measures, such as indeterminate sentencing, designed to
increase a prisoner’s motivation to behave correctly. Id.; see also Garvey, supra note 46
(describing the harsh treatment that is avoided through the contract system); supra note 47
(explaining the progressive grading system that was becoming popular in prisons as a
motivational tool).
181
See Garvey, supra note 46, at 350 (using Pennsylvania’s “‘silent’[ ] system” to explain
prevailing notions of criminality and dismissing the treatment as unconstitutional); supra
notes 46, 124 (noting that Pennsylvania’s famous warehouse prisons required prisoners to
remain in constant, silent solitude, which eventually and unexpectedly drove them insane).
182
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 159 (explaining that one reason for poor conditions
was that the prison population was booming despite a steady decline in prison labor); see
also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 159 (arguing that a prisoner under the care of a warden is
better cared for, “although one must not infer that he is thereby adequately cared for[.]”).
183
See supra notes 177–82 (analyzing some of the shortcomings of the contract model).
184
See supra note 121 (under the piece-price system, a buyer pays a flat price per unit of
output); see also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 160 (same); infra notes 185–90 and
accompanying text (outlining positive aspects of the system, such as prison officials’
opportunity to rehabilitate prisoners, and negative aspects, such as the ever-present friction
of the model with free labor).
185
See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 159. Robinson also notes an advantage of the system—
the likelihood of reduced problems between contractor and government because opposing
interests are more separated. Id.
180
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therefore costliness.186 In addition, the stress on free market competition
with businesses that do not employ prison labor still exists.187
The piece-price system fails to satisfy either the liberal ideal of
reformation or the conservative ideal of punishment.188 From a liberal
perspective, reformation fails because prisoners are not generally taught
the job-finding and job-holding skills that a functional member of society
requires.189 From the conservative perspective, punishment fails because
prisoners are given many of the luxuries of a free person and therefore
are not made to pay for their crime.190 At this point, no model satisfies
either side of the spectrum, and prison costs continue to increase with
each model.191
In contrast to the lease model, the contract and piece-price models do
not obviously violate any constitutional provisions.192 Assuming prison
administrators attend to the welfare of prisoners without deliberate
indifference—historically a difficult accusation to prove—they are not
inflicting cruel or unusual punishment.193 Based on the case history

186
See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting that prison administrators take on
the job of foreman as well because they supervise the prisoners’ quality of work). See also
ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 160 (explaining that while the contractor may send inspectors
to ensure quality control, they are not foremen in any sense of the word, as the government
is ultimately responsible for management).
187
See MCKELVEY, supra note 48, at 94–95. The growing industrial belt of the early 1880s,
encompassing states from Massachusetts to Illinois, was the first region to organize against
prison labor. Id. at 94. By 1887, all states in the industrial belt, except Indiana, set up
commissions to investigate the effects of prison labor on the free market. Id. See also Sexton
et al., supra note 48, at 1 (describing Congress’ attempt to limit prison manufacturing
through “anti-contract” clauses in the early 1900s).
188
See infra notes 189–91 and accompanying text (the system fails to sufficiently reform or
punish); see also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 160 (most of the failures of the contract system
apply with equal force to the piece-price model).
189
See supra note 122 (prison administrators are now trying to implement programs that
prepare prisoners for the world outside by employing them at jobs at which they could
continue upon parole and by teaching them useful job skills beyond the unskilled menial
labor performed in the past).
190
See supra Part II.D (discussing continuing public discontent with the treatment of
prisoners, centering on a belief that prison life is “too easy”).
191
See supra notes 162–90 (noting that each model fails to satisfy any objective of
imprisonment completely, and explaining that as government retains more control over
prisoners, the cost of imprisonment rises).
192
See infra notes 193–94 (indicating that based on the high hurdles prisoners must
overcome and the low administration standards the Court accepts, the contract and pieceprice systems would likely withstand constitutional scrutiny, despite their wisdom as
prison labor policies).
193
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98–108 (1976). In Estelle, the Court concluded that
the conduct alleged in the prisoner’s claim must be egregious, as even a botched execution
attempt does not constitute deliberate indifference but simply “an innocent misadventure.”
Id.; see also discussion supra note 85 (connecting the execution attempt in Resweber to the
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discussed in Part II, even a warden’s serious negligence in attending to
injuries incurred as a result of the private contractor’s negligence will not
rise to the level of deliberate indifference.194
A truly successful public-account system, the fourth model of prison
labor, would cripple the free labor market, which is perhaps why the
system has never been seriously considered.195 The monetary incentives
of such a model are nonexistent because, while the piece-price model
may be operated at a real profit for the government, the public-account
model would be virtually impossible to operate for a real profit.196 First,
the cost of administration is further increased because the government
has to hire more specialized prison employees.197 Second, there are still
no real incentives for prisoners to work hard, unless the model is run for
non-monetary profit.198
Non-monetary profit is achieved by implementing a wholehearted
reformation program for prisoners.199 Giving prisoners an opportunity
to take pride in the product and learn a new skill, while maintaining the
penalties normally associated with disobedience in a penitentiary, allows

negligent medical care in Estelle, which resulted from a heavy bail of cotton falling on, and
injuring, a prisoner).
194
See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98–108 (holding that a prisoner who was injured by a six
hundred pound bail of cotton, and who subsequently returned to work, did not have a
section 1983 claim because the treatment did not amount to deliberate indifference).
195
See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text (noting that the public-account system
removes private parties from the production process but allows them to purchase the
finished product on the open market). See also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 161 (defining the
public-account system as a closed system). Certain industries were virtually eliminated in
the free market because of such success as a prison industry. Id.
196
See id. (hypothesizing that the reason the system could not be operated at a profit is
because the prison employees would be higher-paid); infra notes 197–98 and accompanying
text (explaining particular problems with the system, including the need to hire specialized
wardens and a lack of motivation for prisoners).
197
See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 162 (while the traditional warden’s sole profession is
to manage prisoners as prisoners, a warden under the public-account system would also
need business and trade knowledge to manage prisoners as employees); see also supra note
144 (two United States commissions in the early Twentieth century “frown[ed]” on the
system, which helped lead to its decline).
198
See Sexton et al., supra note 48, at 3 (the third example of a hybrid program in
Minnesota draws on this model and runs without the expectation of profit, but for the
benefit of the prisoners); supra note 122 (the Minnesota hybrid program teaches prisoners a
skill, namely assembling computer processors, that they can apply to work after
imprisonment).
199
See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the myriad benefits of prison
labor programs and the government’s renewed interest in them); see also supra note 115 (the
Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program enables prisons to apply for
certificates that allow them to sell their products interstate, thus circumventing Congress’s
earlier use of the Commerce Clause to prevent the sale of prison-made goods).
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for a real possibility of reform.200 However, success of such a program
hinges on the public’s acceptance of the resulting loss of profit.
Nevertheless, it is not impossible to imagine a contemporary system able
to market incredibly inexpensive products to the public, while
simultaneously reinforcing the positive impact the products will have on
society.201
Fifth, the state-use model has the same monetary drawbacks and
non-monetary incentives as the public-account model.202 The free labor
market would undoubtedly favor this system because it no longer has to
compete with cheap prison-made goods marketed to the same potential
consumers.203 However, with the growing number of prisons being built
and maintained, private contracts for prison construction, maintenance,
and supply have become big business and certain special interests would
likely lobby to keep those contracts on the free market, as opposed to
delegating them to be handled within the prison itself.204
The Indiana example discussed previously, in which the Indiana
governor’s office commissioned a prison woodworking shop to build a
new table for the office, illustrates the benefits of the state-use model
because the prisoners created a product of which they were proud while
obtaining a skill.205 Furthermore, the governor’s office not only acquired
a piece of functional art for a great price, but it also became a positive
symbol of what imprisonment in the new millennium could yield.206

200
See supra note 148 and accompanying text for an example of an Indiana prison project
that was non profit-making, but had non-monetary benefits for the prisoners and the state.
See also Miller, supra note 112 (discussing the federal government’s reinvestigation of prison
labor and its possible benefits).
201
See supra note 122 (indicating that several states have reintroduced prison labor
programs that are designed to accommodate the private sector through purchasing,
investing, or other means, in an attempt to reduce market friction).
202
See Garvey, supra note 46, at 344–45 (noting that the state-use model is very similar to
the public-account system in that it builds on the increased government involvement of the
public-account system by calling for state agencies to be the sole purchasers of the prisonmanufactured products).
203
See supra note 145 (explaining that the system was so favored by the public that by
1940 the state-use system was the dominant model for prison labor).
204
See supra note 146 (noting that, generally, the state is required to purchase their goods
from the prison unless the prison cannot fill the request); see also ROBINSON, supra note 47,
at 161 (noting that, in contrast to prisons, jails do not usually employ the state-use system
because they are numerous and generally decentralized, whereas the state-use model
requires centralization, planning, and organization among prison entities).
205
See supra note 148 (explaining that the Indiana governor’s office commissioned a
prison woodworking shop to create a new table for the office).
206
See supra note 148 (noting that the table depicted the shape of Indiana and the prison
workers inlaid each county with a different piece of wood found only in the state).
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The sixth and final traditional model, the public-works-and-ways
model, is as imperfect as the other models.207 The largest drawback of a
public-works-and-ways system is the state’s transportation and
administration costs associated with bringing and supervising the
prisoners on the jobsite, instead of in the confines of a prison.208 Despite
these difficulties, in 1995, Alabama became the first state in nearly half a
century to employ the use of chain gangs for public works.209 Since 1995,
other states such as Florida and Michigan have reinstituted the chain
gang as well.210 Chain gangs satisfy the public desire for tangible
punishment by creating a visible display of retribution on, for example,
the side of a state highway.211
Although Alabama’s form of the public-works-and-ways system has
spawned considerable debate about its constitutionality and wisdom, or
lack thereof, other forms of the system could be much more beneficial to
207
See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 168 (the public-works-and-ways model is essentially a
state-use system that only employs prisoners to work government projects). The publicworks-and-ways model focuses prison labor on public projects such as building or
repairing roads, “draining swamps,” or “reforesting devastated areas.” Id. at 169.
208
See id. at 167–68. Robinson cites several arguments for the system, including an
improvement in prisoner health from working outside and the ease with which the prisons
can acquire appropriations for public projects. Id.
209
See Morley, supra note 115, at Features, and Ozimek, supra note 116, at 763 (describing
the growing phenomenon of chain gangs in Alabama, Florida, and Wisconsin, to name a
few states).
210
See Peloso, supra note 116, at 1459–60. The public sees prisons as affording inmates
too many luxuries: cable television, exercise facilities, and libraries to name a few. Id. The
main driving force for the reintroduction of chain gangs is the legislators’ responses to the
public’s perception that prison is a “cake-walk” and is not retributive enough. Id. at 1460–
62.
211
See Interview, supra note 4 (Sheriff Joe Arpaio believes strongly that shame can serve
as a punishment and an incentive to reform). The prisoners are therefore at the forefront of
drivers’ minds, and the drivers’ gawking causes shame and embarrassment for the
prisoners. Id. In fact, many politicians proudly say that shame and embarrassment are
main objectives of the chain-gang. Id. States like Alabama, concededly for ulterior
purposes, have employed the chain-gang method of supervision. Id.; Morley, supra note
115, at Features (Limestone Correctional Facility in Alabama uses primarily repeat
offenders or other inmates that have already been stripped of other privileges). Like chain
gangs of the early Twentieth century, prisoners wear bright colored or striped jumpsuits
and are connected together in groups of twenty to thirty by chains and shackles. Id. See
also Cohen, supra note 115 (describing the sight of the chain gang workers); Jeanne Martha
Perreault, Chain Gang Narratives and the Politics of "Speaking For," 24 U. HAW. PRESS 152, 152
(2001). The shackles used on chain gangs of the early Twentieth century would rub on
prisoners’ ankles, creating sores known as “shackle poison.” Perreault at 152. Currently, at
least one prison guard, who is usually armed with a shotgun, supervises each gang. Id.;
Morley, supra note 115, at Features (describing Alabama’s renewed use of chain gangs).
One can see how this sight would burn an image in the onlooker’s mind and also cause
shame and embarrassment to the prisoner. Id. See generally Cullen, supra note 45
(discussing the possibility of successful reformation and rehabilitation).
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the state, the prisoners, and the public.212 For example, the use of chains
to connect prisoners is completely unnecessary in a practical sense and,
when used contemporarily, can only be seen as a political gimmick.213
Furthermore, weapons technology has advanced since the early
twentieth century to include a wide variety of effective yet non-lethal
arms, rendering firearms unnecessary to maintain control over
workers.214
Aside from the lease and contract models, the remaining models do
not pose serious constitutional concerns, assuming they are administered
according to the standards the Court has set forth.215 In fact, the models
would work most successfully when they exceed the Court’s
expectations.216 Historically, the Court has deferred a great deal to the
wisdom of prison administrators absent clear abuses of power.217 The
Court has accepted and affirmed time after time—even in the new
millennium—that the standard of care the Court requires of prison
administrators is very low in order to pass constitutional muster.218
Moreover, with respect to prisoners’ due process rights, the Court has
relied, especially since 1995, on internal grievance procedures to filter
out the frivolous claims and bring serious violations to the surface.219
212
See infra Part IV text and accompanying notes (proposing a new model code for the
operation of prison labor).
213
See Mireya Navarro, Florida to Resume Chain Gangs: Rules on Shackles are Criticized, THE
NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 21, 1995), available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9B02E3DD1339F932A15752C1A963958260 (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) (corrections
specialists have differing views on the purpose and utility of chaining prisoners together).
214
See Lev Grossman, Beyond the Rubber Bullet, TIME MAGAZINE (Jul. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,322588,00.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2008). There are many alternatives to the traditional firearm. Id. For example, tailstabilized bean-bag guns and sponge guns deliver a powerful punch to the recipient
without the possibility of breaking the recipient’s limbs. Id. Other cutting edge methods of
non-lethal force include heat guns, which deliver a powerful burning feeling without
actually burning the skin, and deployable Kevlar nets, which immobilize an individual
without injuring him. Id.
215
See supra Part II.C (explaining the guidelines the Court has used since the industrial
revolution, including the “evolving standards of decency” and “deliberate indifference”
tests).
216
See infra Part IV.B (presenting new models of prison labor that attempt to cure the
failures of traditional models while exceeding Constitutional expectations).
217
See supra Parts II.A, II.C.4 (discussing the deference accorded to prison administrators
under various circumstances).
218
See supra Parts II.C.4, II.D (examining the deliberate indifference standard and its
application to different constitutional challenges prisoners have raised).
219
See supra note 114 (defining the Prison Litigation Reformation Act and its
requirements); Morley, supra note 115, at Features. To exemplify the Court’s return to the
hands-off doctrine, consider that the Alabama chain gangs, despite their controversy, have
not been held unconstitutional. Id.; supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text (stating that
the Supreme Court has not decided the constitutionality of chain gangs).
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Each of the six models has been tested by society and deemed at
least a partial failure at some point in history.220 Instead of discarding
the old models completely, a more modest and perhaps successful
approach would be to take the benefits of each system, test them against
constitutional problems, and combine them to create a new model that
will satisfy the punishment, rehabilitative, and constitutional objectives
of imprisonment.221
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND MODEL CODE FOR PRISON LABOR
PROGRAMS
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth.222
By combining the best aspects of each of the six models with a new
perspective of constitutionality, a new model Code can be constructed as
a template for federal, state, and municipal legislatures to adopt.223 The
Code must take into account the direction in which the country appears
to be moving and the possible future of the definition “evolving
standards of decency” to survive enduring constitutional scrutiny.224 It
must also provide for sufficient economic and non-economic successes to
sustain itself in the public forum and ultimately avoid political
backlash.225 This Note asserts that the tools to create a successful prison
labor model are readily available in the existing models of prison labor
as well as existing jurisprudential doctrine regarding prisoners’ rights,
and proposes a new uniform Code for such a model.226

See supra Part III (analyzing the six models and the reasons they have failed
historically).
221
See infra Part IV (proposing a new model code containing prison labor systems that
are beneficial to the government, and the prisoner, and would also meet the Supreme
Court’s constitutional tests).
222
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
223
See infra Part IV.B (proposing a new model code of prison labor).
224
See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (concerning the “evolving standards of decency” test
propounded in Trop).
225
See supra Part II.C (discussing the fickle public attitude toward prisons and criminals).
226
See infra Part IV.B (proposing an integrated model of prison labor). Regarding this
Note’s proposed statutory language, current statutory language is denoted in regular font,
proposed deletions are denoted in strikethrough font, and additions are denoted in
italicized font.
220
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A. Congress Should Amend 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(1)227
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(1) as follows:
(c) In addition to the exceptions set forth in subsection
(b) of this section, this chapter shall not apply to
goods, wares, or merchandise manufactured,
produced, or mined by convicts or prisoners who─
(1) are participating in─one of not more than 50
80 non-Federal prison work pilot projects
designated by the Director of the Bureau of
Justice Assistance228
Commentary
This addition loosens the limitations on the movement of prisonmade goods through interstate commerce.229 Given that the Bureau of
Justice Assistance has already issued 41 of 50 certificates, Congress
should authorize the issuance of more certificates to qualifying
jurisdictions, which would further the expansion of work programs that
produce prison-made goods.230
B. Proposed Model Prison Labor Code231
The following Model Prison Labor Code (“MPLC”) should be
implemented:232

See 18 U.S.C. §1761(c)(1) (2000). 18 U.S.C. § 1761 was originally called the Justice
System Improvement Act of 1979. See id.
228
Id. The author of this Note proposes to delete the language that is denoted with a
strikethrough and replace it with the language in italics.
229
See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing federal laws regulating the
movement of prison-manufactured goods in interstate commerce).
230
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program
(PIECP), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/
piecp.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).
231
Unless otherwise noted, this Code’s language is the unique idea of the author of this
Note. Furthermore, this proposed Code does not build on any past legislation or formal
policy, but is a compilation of the traditional labor models set forth in Part II.E. However,
the idea of a hybrid model of prison labor has been introduced in several states, and is
discussed supra, note 122. Essentially, this Code is merely a skeleton of what could be
developed into a detailed manual for successful operation of prison labor programs.
232
The goal of the Section One mission statement and qualifications is to delineate the
requirements for prisoners to enter the programs, and set the standards that prisoners are
required to follow in order to remain in the programs.
227
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MPLC § 1-100 Goals of Prison Labor
The goals of all prison labor programs are as follows:
(a) To serve the community by releasing inmates who are better
prepared to be productive, law abiding members of society.
(b) To serve inmates by teaching them valuable skills and work
habits, and by making them disciplined and productive.
(c) To serve the Jurisdiction by generating revenue to reduce
costs associated with imprisonment.
(d) To serve society at large by carrying out the sentence
imposed by the Judicial system in a strict, yet meaningful,
way.
MPLC § 1-102 Prisoner Grievance Procedure233
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e), prisoners shall exhaust administrative
remedies before filing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.234
The
complaining prisoner shall be entitled to the following:
(a) written notice of violations;
(b) access to any and all evidence against him regarding the
written notice of violation;
(c) an opportunity to present his case, including the
opportunity to present evidence, witnesses, and rebuttal to
State’s evidence, to a neutral panel of fact-finders;
(d) access to the written decision of the fact-finders before
or
immediately following revocation of a prisoner’s status or
privileges.
MPLC § 1-103 Qualifications for Participation in Prison Labor Programs
All general population prisoners shall work in some capacity unless they
are medically disqualified, as determined by a medical professional. The
Department of Corrections or its organizations shall determine the
percentage of time each prisoner shall spend per week in work
programs, educational programs, and treatment programs. The total
amount of time spent in the combined programs shall not exceed forty
hours per week, per prisoner.

See supra note 114 and accompanying text (providing the text and explanation of the
Prison Litigation Reformation Act).
234
See Suits by Prisoners, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000). See supra note 83 for the text of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 regarding civil actions for deprivation of rights.
233
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MPLC § 1-104 Qualifications for Participation in Work Release or Work
Furlough Programs
(a) Each prison in the Jurisdiction shall have either a work
release or work furlough program, or both.
(b) Minimum security prisoners incarcerated for a nonviolent
offense may petition the Department of Community
Corrections for admission to a work release or work
furlough program when they have not more than twelve
months of their sentence, including good time credit,
remaining.
(c) The Department of Community Corrections shall have sole
discretion over admission into work release programs.
(d) The Department of Community Corrections shall:
(1) notify applicants within thirty days of their acceptance
or denial;
(2) provide an explanation of why applicants were denied
and whether they are qualified to apply again if they
complete clearly outlined requirements (such as further
job training);
(3) place accepted applicants in a qualified work release
program, supervised by a Community Corrections
Officer within sixty days of acceptance;
(4) establish procedures for Community Corrections
Officers to periodically evaluate work release prisoners
including, but not limited to:
(i) requiring prisoners to make and follow a detailed
daily schedule;
(ii) requiring regular drug testing; and
(iii) requiring prisoners to abide by a curfew, the
violation of which will initiate re-evaluation by
Community Corrections Officers for the fitness of
the prisoners to continue in the program.
MPLC § 1-105 Qualifications for Participation in Shock Incarceration
Programs
Inmates may participate in shock incarceration programs on a voluntary
basis if:
(a) the instant offense is their first felony conviction; and
(b) they are sentenced to not more than seven years in a
Jurisdiction prison; and
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(c) the Jurisdiction Probation Department Pre-Sentence
Investigation Report, the sentencing court, and the
Department of Corrections unanimously recommend a
Shock Incarceration Program.
Commentary
The mission statement of the Code is important because it establishes
that the Code is meant to satisfy goals of retribution and rehabilitation.
The Code is designed to give administrators flexibility in imposing labor
requirements while still providing a structure within which to adhere.
Therefore, strict requirements are set forth outlining that, generally,
prisoners must work, but that not all prisoners are suitable for all
programs. Finally, because the Court has held that prisoners are
guaranteed a minimum level of due process before or immediately
following disciplinary action, the Code includes a section specifically
dedicated to grievance procedures.235
MPLC § 2-201 Prisoner Status—Level Three236
(a) All prisoners shall enter as level three inmates on either
maximum or medium security status. Level three inmates
are afforded only basic provisions meeting constitutional
protections and are allowed limited additional amenities
solely in the discretion of the prison administrators. Level
three inmates shall work for the benefit of the Jurisdiction on
public works projects or prison projects in controlled inmate
groups and shall abide by the rules of said groups, or be
subject to discipline from prison administrators.
(b) All level three inmates shall wear pink jumpsuits displaying
the prisoner’s identification number and the statute number
under which he was convicted.
(c) All level three inmates are expected to progress to level two
status within six months of intake; however, prison

See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972). Morrissey outlined the
procedures to which prisoners are entitled. Id. This Code includes those procedures
needed to satisfy constitutional guarantees as outlined by the Court.
236
Creating different levels of status is deliberately reminiscent of the caste system,
which is of questionable success in a free society but would be useful in a controlled society
as both a motivation to comply with the rules and a tool for punishment for those
individuals who do not comply. See CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 179 (discussing the
prisoner status level system employed at Elmira Reformatory).
235
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administrators have sole discretion as to the status level of
inmates.
MPLC § 2-202 Prisoner Status—Level Two
(a) Prisoners may spend up to ninety percent of their
incarceration as level two inmates.
(b) Level two inmates shall wear brightly colored jumpsuits to
distinguish them from other levels of inmates, which shall
include their identification numbers, but no other
information.
(c) Prisoners may enjoy increased access to amenities as
determined by prison administrators, including, but not
limited to:
(1) increased television, telephone, radio, library, and
internet access;
(2) increased access to exercise equipment; and
(3) increased out-of-cell visiting time.
(d) All prisoners obtaining level two status shall:
(1) work in one of the available work programs within the
Jurisdiction unless they are disqualified for a medical
reason as determined by a medical professional;
(2) continue educational, vocational, and treatment
programming;
(3) commit a minimal amount of infractions as determined
by the prison administrator; and
(4) show progress as determined by the prison
administrator.
(e) Level two inmates may progress to level one status as
determined by the prison administrators.
MPLC § 2-203 Prisoner Status—Level One
(a) All level one inmates are classified as minimum security
status.
(b) Level one inmates have demonstrated the ability to behave
as a member of a community and are thus treated as closely
to a member of the community as is possible in an
institutional setting. Accordingly, level one inmates enjoy a
list of benefits including, but not limited to:
(1) greatest access to amenities;
(2) greatest out-of-cell time;
(3) opportunities for the highest paying jobs; and
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(4) opportunities for work release and work furlough
programs.
(c) Level one inmates shall wear brightly colored jumpsuits to
distinguish them from other levels of inmates, which shall
display their name and identification number, but no other
information.
Commentary
Creating status levels for prisoners that are easily identifiable to both
corrections officers and other inmates intentionally creates segregation in
the prison community. As compared to a caste system, level three
inmates are treated with less respect than level two inmates, and so
forth.
While this system is retributive, shaming, and possibly
embarrassing for inmates by printing their offenses clearly on their
apparel, it also reinforces a desire for upward mobility that will translate
into a similar desire outside prison walls.
Importantly, the outlined treatment of level three inmates satisfies
the mandates of the Court in its interpretation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments because it is clearly related to overarching
penological objectives. Of course, the actual implementation of the
system may result in some acts of unnecessary and wanton conduct by
renegade corrections officers, but that risk is inherent in any corrections
facility and does not discount the true intention of the Code.237
MPLC § 3-301 Limitations on Prison Work Programs238
Individual prisons are not limited to any of the work programs defined
in this Code. Institutions may create work programs as it sees fit to
further the goals set forth in this Code and to the extent allowed under
law.
Commentary
The purpose of Section 3-301 is to reinforce the need for flexibility
within each institution. Each correctional facility is different not only in
the prison population, but in the capability for industry within the
facility, as well as in the surrounding market conditions. Prison
237
See supra notes 94 & 101 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes
constitutionally prohibited conduct by corrections officers).
238
The goal of this provision is to make clear that this Code is not all-inclusive. States
should be encouraged to experiment with hybrids of all existing models and to invent new
models.
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administrators must be given deference in deciding what programs best
fit their institutions. However, the author of this Note presents this Code
containing a wide variety of programs, all of which could be successful
when applied to the correct environment.239 The ultimate goal of the
Code is to institute enough programs in each institution so that every
general population prisoner is laboring in some capacity.
MPLC § 4-401 Shock Incarceration Programs
Shock Incarceration programs shall be designed to fit each individual
institution’s needs, but shall incorporate the following elements:
(a) military boot camp-style discipline and training;
(b) a strictly regimented schedule;
(c) clearly defined rules and penalties;
(b) mentally and physically demanding labor; and
(e) cognitive skills training.
Shock Incarceration programs shall be evaluated by the Jurisdiction
Department of Corrections if it exceeds a thirty percent drop out rate or
falls below a ten percent drop out rate.
Commentary
The Shock Incarceration Program outlined in this Code closely
parallels the Federal shock incarceration program approved in 18 U.S.C.
§ 4046.240
MPLC § 5-501 Public Sector Programs Definition241
Section Five labor models shall be completely funded, operated,
managed, and evaluated by the Jurisdiction Department of Corrections.
All laborers for this model shall be medium security inmates from the
general prison population. All laborers work on either a good-time
reduction incentive program, or a piece-price system in which inmates
are paid per unit of product they complete. Laborers are not required to
use any of their wages to recoup the costs of their incarceration.

239
See Sexton et al., supra note 48, at 3 (providing examples of pilot programs showing
success).
240
See supra note 118 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Shock
Incarceration Program.
241
See supra Parts II.E & III (the public sector models draw on, and expands upon, the
state-use and public-works-and-ways models of prison labor explained in Part II.E and
analyzed in Part III).
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MPLC § 5-502 Controlled Inmate Group Public Works Program
(a) The Controlled Inmate Group Program shall substitute any
and all forms of “chain gang” in Jurisdiction.
(b) Inmates shall be transported in groups, not to exceed twenty
inmates per group, to public property for the purpose of
conducting maintenance.
(c) One corrections officer shall be responsible for one group of
inmates.
(d) Inmates shall wear brightly colored work-clothes for the
purposes of identification, displaying the inmate’s
identification number, and in addition, a printed or graphic
message, approved by Jurisdiction Department of
Correction, aimed at deterring and preventing crime.
(e) Inmates shall work for eight hours in one day in all safe
working weather conditions, taking one thirty minute break
for lunch and four fifteen minute rest breaks throughout the
work day.
(f) Inmates shall perform the duties as assigned by the
corrections officer or face disciplinary measures upon return
to the prison including, but not limited to, a loss of any
privileges.
(g) Any inmate that attempts to escape the group while in the
course of a work day shall be subdued and captured using
non-lethal force and shall face serious disciplinary measures
when returned to the prison.
MPLC § 5-503 Controlled Inmate Group Prison Works Program
(a) The Controlled Inmate Group Program shall substitute any
and all forms of “chain gang” in Jurisdiction.
(b) Inmates shall be assigned in groups, each group consisting
of five to twenty inmates, to work in various areas within the
prison and for the benefit of the prison. Areas of work
include, but are not limited to:
(1) canteen cleaning and food service;
(2) prison landscaping;
(3) prison laundry;
(4) prison farming of hogs, beef, poultry, and vegetables for
prison consumption;
(5) construction of prison facilities;
(6) woodworking or metalworking for the benefit of the
prison facilities; and
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(7) other prison maintenance.
(c) Inmates shall wear a designated color of work clothes,
displaying either their identification numbers or their names
to distinguish them from other inmates.
(d) Inmates shall work for eight hours in one day in safe
working weather conditions, taking one thirty minute break
for lunch and two fifteen minute rest breaks throughout the
work day.
(e) Inmates shall perform the duties as assigned by the
corrections officer or face disciplinary measures including,
but not limited to, a loss of any privileges.
MPLC § 5-504 Controlled Inmate Group Private Sector Purchaser
Program
(a) The Controlled Inmate Group Program shall substitute any
and all forms of “chain gang” in Jurisdiction.
(b) The Department of Corrections prison industry shall
produce all goods and services for the benefit of one private
sector purchaser on the open market.
(c) The private sector purchaser shall maintain a contract with
the prison facility for a fixed term to be renewed at the
purchaser’s desire.
(d) The private sector purchaser shall have insubstantial
financial or managerial interest in the industry.
(e) Unconventional corrections officers may be employed that
have special knowledge of the industry and can act as
foremen. Unconventional corrections officers shall not be a
substitute for traditionally trained corrections officers.
(f) Inmates shall work for eight hours in one day in safe
working weather conditions, taking one thirty minute break
for lunch and two fifteen minute rest breaks throughout the
workday.
(g) Inmates shall perform the duties as assigned by the
corrections officer or face disciplinary measures including,
but not limited to, a loss of any privileges.
Commentary
The term “controlled inmate group” includes level two or level three
inmates who pose a security risk. Despite the constitutionality of the
traditional “chain gang,” new technology makes chaining even high-risk
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prisoners together unnecessary.242 Because the retributive component of
incarceration is satisfied in other ways throughout the Code, the sole
purpose of the use of weapons is for safety.
These model statutory provisions maintain a closed-market prison
model in which prisoners perform labor directly for the prison, and
solely for the prison’s benefit. They are most suited for prisons without
the facilities to set up large production centers. Furthermore, these
models are most profitable when coupled with strong incentives for
prisoners to work hard, such as a reduction of sentence.
MPLC § 6-601 Private Sector Models Definition243
Section Six labor models may be funded publicly by the Jurisdiction,
privately by businesses, or by both. All laborers for this model shall be
medium security inmates from the general prison population. All
laborers work for either minimum wage, or the market value of their
work. Their rate of payment shall be governed by the legislation of
Jurisdiction. Laborers are required to use a portion of their wages to
recoup the costs of their incarceration. A laborer’s wages are to be
distributed as follows:
Thirty-three percent (33%) shall be paid directly to the Jurisdiction
Department of Corrections to offset costs of room and board.
Five percent (5%) shall be paid to the Jurisdiction agency in charge of
Jurisdiction’s victim assistance program.
Any previously court-ordered support for spouses or dependants
shall be paid out of the laborer’s wages, not applying to arrears or
accruing with interest.
Any remaining portion may be kept by the laborer to use as he
chooses, unless monetary penalties have been assessed by the prison, in
which case that amount shall be deducted from laborer’s wages in equal
amounts each pay period until paid, not to exceed ten percent (10%) of
the total earned per period.
MPLC § 6-602 Private Sector Investing
Private sector businesses shall not be prohibited from investing in
prison industries, without further obligation to the prison. The
242
See Grossman, supra note 214 (presenting alternatives to chains and shackles, such as
tail stabilized bean-bag guns, sponge guns, and nets).
243
See supra note 122 (describing test programs in several states). The private sector
models in this Code are loosely based on the lease, contract, piece-price, and public-account
models explained in Part II.E. See Sexton et al., supra note 48, at 3. The Code also
incorporates hybrid models that some states are currently testing. Id.
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businesses shall have no guarantee of profitable return of their money
and may withdraw their investment at any time.
MPLC § 6-603 Private Sector Management of Prison Industry
Private Sector businesses shall not be prohibited from managing
prison industries without further obligation or involvement in the
industry.
MPLC § 6-604 Private Sector Ownership of Prison Industry
Private Sector businesses shall not be prohibited from owning prison
industries, regardless of whether they are the dominant purchaser of
goods. The business shall have exclusive management of aspects of the
business including, but not limited to:
(a) hiring and firing;
(b) acceptable standards of work required of prison employees; and
(c) production.
MPLC § 6-605 Joint Private and Public Ownership
Private sector businesses shall not be prohibited from joining with
Jurisdiction Department of Corrections Facilities in forming a business
partnership. The private sector business shall be responsible for
management of the joint venture to the extent it is a partner. The
applicable laws of Jurisdiction will govern such a partnership.
MPLC § 6-606 Dominant Purchaser Private Sector Partner
Private sector businesses shall not be prohibited from being both a
partner with Jurisdiction Department of Correction Facilities and the
dominant purchaser of goods produced.
Commentary
These model statutory provisions, designed for use with level two
inmates, seek to mend the fences between the public and private sector.
By allowing the widest variety of private sector involvement,
jurisdictions have options for the program that present the least friction
with free labor, while also presenting the greatest opportunity for profit.
Furthermore, prisoners are offsetting the cost of their own incarceration
by paying one-third of their wages to the Department of Corrections.
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The benefits to prisoners are also abundant. Most importantly, the
risk of constitutional violations of prisoners’ rights is very low because
inmates are under the joint control of the public and private sector.
Second, prisoners learn to manage their money in a basic way by being
forced to apportion it according to the Code. Third, prisoners may learn
valuable job-seeking skills because private sector businesses using prison
labor may require actual applications and interviews before hiring.
Fourth, prisoners have the opportunity to work in one industry for a
longer period of time and learn the skills of that industry, which will
allow them to pursue working in that industry after their release from
incarceration.
This Code is a basic template for a more integrated model of prison
labor. The Court, through its interpretation of what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment, allows wide latitude for the implementation of
programs aimed at retribution and rehabilitation.244 It is unwise and
untrue to maintain that the two ideals cannot function together, just as it
is unwise and untrue to maintain that free labor and forced labor cannot
coexist.
V. CONCLUSION
The current statistics surrounding many aspects of imprisonment in
the United States demonstrate that the current system is unacceptable.245
In fact, if the current trends continue, this nation’s leaders will have to
make difficult decisions about how to imprison, who to imprison, and
how much can be spent on imprisonment. However, the current trends
do not have to continue, as this Note has suggested.
This Note recounted the history of prisoners’ rights in America from
the establishment of the Republic to the present.246 Furthermore, it
analyzed the constitutional principles expounded in history as applied to
labor in correctional institutions.247 Finally, it proposed to balance the
goals of imprisonment with constitutional protections through a model
that requires all general population prisoners to work as part of their
punishment and reform.248

244
See supra Part III (concluding that the tests the Supreme Court has applied to
determine the constitutionality of prison conditions are generally easy for the government
to satisfy).
245
See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text for a brief list of pertinent statistics.
246
See supra Part II (discussing the case law surrounding the treatment of prisoners).
247
See supra Part III.B (applying constitutional standards to traditional prison labor
models).
248
See supra Part IV.B (laying out a framework for an integrated model of prison labor).
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In summary, the four pillars of imprisonment—punishment,
retribution, rehabilitation, and reform—do not have to be in opposition,
butting up against constitutional protections and public desires. In fact,
the four can all be satisfied through new models of prison labor that
benefit the state, the prisoner, and private interests. The Eighth
Amendment grew out of fear of excruciating and inhumane punishment.
It has metamorphosed into perhaps the only Amendment that ensures
both protection and punishment for prisoners. The new model Code
proposed in this Note embraces the duality of the Eighth Amendment
and uses it to create a positive and integrated system of prison labor,
hopefully retiring the historical friction surrounding imprisonment in
the United States.
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